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Historically, both management researchers and practitioners have recognized the 
importance of diversity among company employees, especially top executives. Two opposing 
views exist regarding the impact of diversity on the efficiency of a business. While proponents of 
executive diversity assert that heterogeneity provides significant benefits to business performance, 
opponents contend that the demographic heterogeneity of the top management team (TMT) leads 
to conflicts and decreased communication efficiency (Ashton, 2010; Coleman, 2013, Mayhew, 
2013).  
The need to increase diversity among employees gained attention several decades ago. The 
demographic diversity of an executive board positively impacts the company’s performance (Joshi 
et al., 2011; Parry & Urwin, 2011). Several authors have argued that diversity stimulates debates, 
improves the decision-making process, and positively affects firm performance (Joshi et al., 2011; 
Parry, 2014; Parry & Urwin, 2011; Watson et al., 1993). Relatedly, Qi and Tian (2012) buttressed 
the discussions that TMT diversity provides opportunities for changing earnings management 
behavior. Similarly, myriad research conducted along this line of study has suggested that most 
variables of diversity, including age, gender, and culture, could impact the firm’s performance 
significantly (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Parola et al., 2015; Sila et al., 2016; Talke et al., 2010). 
  An organization’s earnings management is performed by its TMT, and several scholars 




Nielsen, 2013; Parry & Urwin, 2011). Yet there is little or no literature in the management research 
findings investigating how TMT diversity influences earnings management.  
Earnings Management  
Earnings management is the process of choosing accounting practices that result in 
reporting earnings that are advantageous to the firm and its TMT at the expense of its external 
stakeholders (Bhaumik, 2010; Dal Maso et al., 2020; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Jara et al., 2019; 
Tessma, 2020). Earnings management includes financial reporting through various manipulations, 
such as reporting higher profits and lower expenses in a given year when creating periodic or 
annual reports (Qi & Tian, 2012). Earnings management is not dependent on solely the chief 
executive officer (CEO) or the chief financial officer (CFO) but on the entire TMT. Hence, 
earnings management requires collaboration between TMT members (Bonacchi et al., 2017; Qi & 
Tian, 2012). For instance, the manipulative practice of sending more products into the market than 
can be sold, called channel stuffing, must be coordinated with operations and marketing officers 
in order to work (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Fields et al., 2001; Habib, 2007).  
  When organizations manage their earnings to show higher profits and lower expenses,  it 
has negative consequences for stakeholders (Bhaumik & Gregorious, 2010; Hong & Andersen, 
2011; Prior et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2007). For example, shareholders use financial information as a 
source for decision-making regarding investments. Thus, distortions in financial information may 
cause shareholders to make unintended decisions (IFN, 2015). Earnings management activities are 
blamed for the bankruptcies and collapse of Enron and WorldCom. Enron avoided recording 
liabilities, while WorldCom employed inappropriate revenue recognition procedures. These 
inappropriate earnings management behaviors misled investors and caused them to lose their 




2013; Kim & Park, 2012). Earnings management practices are dishonest and unethical, especially 
if management’s intentions are opportunistic, like benefiting from stock options and bonuses or 
misleading stakeholders (IFN, 2015).  
Accounting Standards 
Accounting standards give a wide range of discretion to managers on how financial 
statements should be prepared and presented to stakeholders (Bartov et al., 2005; Brown et al., 
2014; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Psaros, 2007). This latitude and discretion unfortunately create an 
avenue for some managers with opportunistic tendencies to manipulate earnings. These managers 
prepare financial statements and reports that are beneficial to themselves at the expense of the 
shareholders (Bartov et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2014; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Overwhelming 
evidence suggests that earnings management is practiced for opportunistic reasons (Beaudoin et 
al., 2015; Elias, 2004; Qi et al., 2018; Roychowdhury, 2006). The managers’ opportunism 
influences them to unethically deceive stakeholders on the actual performance and risk of the firm 
they are managing. It has been established that publicly traded firms indulge in earnings 
management for a variety of reasons, including deliberate attempts to influence analysts’ and the 
public’s perceptions of the value of the firm; attract a lower cost of debt; and potentially reduce 
debt covenant violations.  
Ethical Decision-Making 
The subject of ethical decision-making in the workplace has generated growing interest 
from both researchers and practitioners. Ethics has been studied at both the individual and 
organizational levels (Beaudoin, 2014; DeGrassi et al., 2012; Ford, 1994). Individual-level studies 




culture and corporate social responsibility (DeGrassi et al., 2012). These studies have concluded 
that heterogeneous groups are more inclined to make ethical decisions in comparison to 
homogeneous groups (DeGrassi et al., 2012; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Rao & Tilt, 2016).  
Aim 
The current study examines the impact of TMT diversity on ethical decision-making in 
earnings management at the firm level. I carried out this study purposely to extend the existing 
literature by building upon the argument that TMT heterogeneity leads to improved ethical 
behavior, which subsequently leads to fewer earnings management practices at the firm level.  
Scope of the Study 
Extant studies have documented relationships between CEO- and CFO-specific 
characteristics and earnings management (Beaudoin et al., 2015; Elias, 2004; Qi & Tian, 2012). In 
this study I concentrate on how TMT diversity attributes such as gender, age, job, culture, 
education, tenure, and political affiliation moderate the relationship between ethical decisions of 
earnings management and return on assets (ROA) or debt. Within the framework of the upper 
echelons theory, Hambrick (2007) and Hambrick and Mason (1984) posited that observable and 
verifiable characteristics of TMTs should form the basis of ethical decision-making at the firm 
level. This theory has led to myriad studies. 
  DeGrassi et al. (2012) examined the impact of team heterogeneity on strategic decisions. 
They posited that teams with diverse backgrounds are more inclined to be ethical due to the 
prevalence of divergent ideas and inclusiveness of the thought process. Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) 
furthered the argument in their study, which examined nationality diversity and firm performance. 




process, which implies that TMT members with diverse backgrounds tend to formulate viable 
strategic alternatives marked by a high degree of ethical standard. However, firms tend to hire and 
retain employees who fit their personal preferences, resulting in the employment of comparable 
workers and the creation of homogeneous groups that limit the ability of the company to deal with 
complex decision issues like earnings quality (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Velinov & Kubicek, 
2013). 
In addition to their study on ethics about the decision-making process, DeGrassi et al. 
(2012) revealed that conglomerates such as Enron, Tyco, Hewlett-Packard, and WorldCom 
experienced massive failures and loss of shareholder value due to their lack of ethical behavior in 
corporate boardrooms and sometimes on Wall Street. The authors bolstered their argument with 
the fact that TMT members face challenges in making difficult decisions that could be morally 
confusing, hence blurring the divide between doing right and doing wrong. This lack of ethical 
behavior led to the eventual collapse of these firms, resulting in losses of stakeholders’ lifetime 
investments.  
The Role of Diversity in Organizations 
The role of diversity in an organizational setting needs the understanding of practitioners 
and researchers. Group diversity is vital to decision-making in the workplace since decisions may 
involve ethical issues like the quality of earnings reporting (DeGrassi et al., 2012; Mahadeo et al., 
2012; Rao & Tilt, 2016). When an organization is faced with a moral dilemma, group diversity 
plays a vital role because there is a need for divergent views to resolve the issue. 
Diversity is an essential attribute in group composition, and a heterogeneous group is better 




groups, individuals from various backgrounds bring exceptional viewpoints and knowledge to 
dealing with ethical issues, but these might be lacking in a homogenous group. Furthermore, 
researchers have pointed out that diverse groups show a greater increase in performance over time 
than homogenous groups (DeGrassi et al. 2012; Wan Mohammad et al., 2016). Researchers have 
further indicated that comparatively, when there is an ethical issue that needs resolution, 
homogenous groups are more likely to come to a quick consensus than heterogenous groups 
(DeGrassi et al., 2012; Kouaib & Almulhim, 2019; Qi et al., 2018). A homogenous group may not 
select the morally correct action, probably due to the similarity in viewpoint, which may lead to 
unethical decisions in issues like earnings management. However, the dissimilarity in viewpoint 
of a heterogeneous group brings different qualities and personal knowledge onboard, leading the 
group to delve into the issues at stake before reaching a consensus—for instance, taking better 
action regarding ethical issues like managing earnings (DeGrassi et al., 2012; Kouaib & Almulhim, 
2019; Qi et al., 2018).  
Problem Statement of This Study 
Since earnings management requires an organization’s TMT to execute it, understanding 
the relationship between TMT composition and earnings management is imperative to theory and 
practice. However, prior literature has paid little attention to TMT composition as a predictor of 
earnings management. In this study I address the literature gap by examining the impact of TMT 
attributes on an organization’s earnings management decisions. More specifically, I test whether 
a high degree of TMT diversity influences an organization’s earnings management behavior. I also 
examine how the diversity of the TMT can diminish accounting malpractice, as suggested by 




The reason for this study is to contribute to the existing literature by enhancing our 
understanding of the drivers of TMT behaviors regarding earnings management in publicly traded 
firms, specifically in the United States.  
 Research Questions 
I proposed the following research questions (RQs) to achieve the objectives of this study: 
RQ 1: Does a firm’s TMT diversity impact earnings management?  
RQ2: Which type of TMT diversity has the strongest impact on earnings management? 
RQ3: Do the results of the study fill in the research gaps observed during the literature review? 
In the next section I review the existing literature on earnings management and TMT. The 
subsequent sections comprise discussions of the hypotheses formulation, the empirical methods I 







LITERATURE REVIEW  
Over time, accounting professions have become concerned with earnings management 
behaviors (Ghazali et al., 2015; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Khan, 2012). Earnings management 
transpires when accounting transactions are altered to either mislead stakeholders about 
organizational performance or to report accounting numbers that influence contractual outcomes 
through management judgment (Ghazali et al., 2015; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Khan, 2012). An 
organization has short-term goals to present financial reports to meet specific objectives that they 
deem essential. For the managers to achieve these reporting goals, they manipulate earnings. 
Managers’ manipulation of earnings creates a conflict of interest between stakeholders and 
management (Ghazali et al., 2015; Zakaria et al., 2015). 
Financial reporting is a necessary ingredient for the smooth operation of corporate 
governance. For this reason, the management responsible for the provision of the accounting 
information needs to be of uncompromised integrity and competence. Overwhelming evidence 
suggests that incidents of accounting malpractice used by firms, such as creative accounting, 
earnings management, and earnings guidance, lead to opportunistic gains, so accounting practices 
need to be scrutinized by managers (Beaudoin et al., 2015; Elias, 2004; Qi et al., 2018; 
Roychowdhury, 2006).  
Stakeholders demand financial data to predict future cash returns and evaluate risks 




reporting of periodic financial data, and any manipulation of earnings could mislead the investors. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) indicate that “one function of financial reporting is to constrain 
management to act in the shareholder interest” (p. 113). However, accounting standards allow 
flexibility for managers to use discretion with the earnings they report. Additionally, accounting 
standards enable the use of earnings management for income smoothing, which is a legitimate and 
acceptable practice when used for short-term purposes (Ghazali et al., 2015; Healy & Wahlen, 
1999; Khan, 2012). 
Accounting standards give managers an extensive range of discretion on how they should 
prepare financial statements and present them to stakeholders (Auken & Carraher, 2013; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006; Jamali, 2008; Voinov & Bousquest, 2010). This accounting practice 
creates an opportunity for managers to prepare financial reports that are beneficial to their own 
interests. The opportunistic impulses of these managers influence them to deceive the stakeholders 
about the actual performance and risk of the firm. Accrual management of earnings is the term 
used to describe a change in accounting methods or estimates within the generally accepted 
accounting principles (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Gunny, 2010; Peasnell et al., 2005; Zang, 2012). 
Similarly, Roychowdhury (2006) described earnings management as varying the normal operation 
of real business transactions.  
Earnings management occurs when a firm gives a price discount for an increase in sales to 
reduce the cost of goods when the firm purposefully engages in overproduction to improve margins 
by keeping discretionary spending down (Albernathy et al., 2014; Roychowdhury, 2000; Zang, 
2011). In a related study, Hribar et al. (2006) examined whether management increases earnings 
per share (EPS) by reducing the number of shares, which is the denominator using stock repurchase 




stocks, they will miss the EPS forecast (Hribar et al., 2006). Some other scholars have examined 
the use of derivatives and discretionary accruals as a means of managing earnings. Their respective 
studies indicated that management can use hedging by smoothing cash flows through decreasing 
or increasing accruals (Barton, 2001; Bartram et al., 2012; Beneda, 2013; Choi et al., 2015). 
Additionally, these authors showed that firms with lower absolute levels of discretionary accruals; 
having derivative portfolios holding large amounts are partially substituting derivatives and 
discretionary accruals for earnings smoothing accruals (Barton, 2001; Bartram et al., 2012; 
Beneda, 2013; Choi et al., 2015). 
Al Azeez et al. (2019) researched the impact of board characteristics, including CEO 
duality, board unconventionality, board diversity, and the magnitude of the board on the levels of 
earnings management in the global oil and gas corporations. The results from their study indicated 
that sovereign board diversity has the ability to reduce levels of earnings guidance. On the contrary, 
CEO duality was found to increase earnings management. Thus, separating the roles of the CEO 
and the board of directors chair could solve the problem by enhancing the board’s monitoring and 
control capability, which tends to improve the board’s information-processing capacities. In a 
related study in Nigeria, Omoye and Eriki (2014) conducted a study of Nigerian quoted 
corporations about high and low earnings management and found that, while most of these 
corporations use elevated levels of earnings management, a gender-diversified board has a 
considerable likelihood of using a earnings management. Likewise, a number of authors have 
carried out research on gender diversity (Lakhal et al., 2015; Ozbilgin et al., 2011; Smith-Doerr et 
al., 2017; Turban & Zhang, 2019) and in their respective studies concluded that as the numbers of 
women board directors increase there is an automatic decrease in earnings management and 




The motivation for earnings management by an organization is mostly from capital markets 
and other users of financial statements, which put pressure on management to produce a quality 
financial report for public companies. Capital markets and investors depend on a firm’s financial 
statements to make investment decisions and expect the firm to produce a financial report that 
meets the needs of the stakeholders (Clarkson et al., 2008; Cummins et al., 2017; Homberg & Bui, 
2013; Sherma & Young, 2016). In short, managers are motivated to engage in earnings 
management to meet the stakeholders’ expectations.    
The quality of a financial statement is impacted when the firm’s management participates 
in managing earnings for opportunistic reasons such as boosting their compensation value, 
bonuses, and stock options (Bonacchi et al., 2017). A firm’s management may engage in earnings 
manipulation to satisfy their opportunistic tendencies, which include capital markets, seasoned 
equity issues, and debt covenants (Armstrong, 2010; Bonacchi et al., 2017). These financial 
statements can also mislead external users and harm the stakeholders or shareholders of the firm. 
Furthermore, for short-term decisions managers could manipulate earnings to present their 
financial statements to meet specific objectives that they deem advantageous to themselves or the 
firm (Han et al., 2010). Even though the primary role of accounting accrual is to enhance the 
forecast of future cash flow, research shows that managers may use their discretion to report 
earnings opportunistically (Becker et al., 1998; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Qu et al., 2013; 
Samudhram et al., 2010; Wadesango & Wadesango, 2016; Williams & Adams, 2013). 
 Management can use accruals to opportunistically increase or decrease earnings in various 
contexts, including before preliminary public and seasoned equity offerings. There are several 
studies on the management of earnings during the issuance of equity security (Qu et al., 2013; 




during an equity offering mostly depends on the firm’s stock price on the day of the equity 
issuance, along with its reported earnings. For these reasons, to boost the stock price and increase 
the amount of capital raised, managers can be motivated to manipulate earnings (Baker et al., 2019; 
Goldschmidt & Schmieder, 2017; Kothari et al., 2015). In related research, authors have examined 
seasoned equity offerings and found that firms underperformed years after managers had 
manipulated discretionary accruals to increase earnings during the time of issuance of equity (Qu 
et al., 2013; Rangan 1998; Samudhram et al., 2010; Teoh et al. 1998a; Wadesango & Wadesango, 
2016). The researchers further reported that during the issuance of the seasoned equity, 
discretionary accrual activities went up significantly at the time of the offering and obviously 
declined in later years. Therefore, the process of discretionary accrual manipulation increases net 
income before and during the offer of the equity, and after the equity issuance, the net income falls 
(Maverick, 2020; Qu et al., 2013; Samudhram et al., 2010; Wadesango & Wadesango, 2016). 
Teoh et al. (1998) again evaluated the relationship between equity offerings and managing 
earnings but found a negative correlation between the net income and stock returns at pre- and 
post-issuance stages of the equity offering. Thus, the stock price achieved during the issuance of 
an equity falls considerably the year after the issue. These authors interpreted their results to mean 
that there is a negative relationship between current accruals and stock returns after issuance. This 
was pertinent to all firms during the period 1976 to 1990.  
When going through the initial public offering, companies could apply for positive accruals 
to present net income more than cash flow. However, Teoh et al. (1998a) showed a negative 
relationship between earnings management and the long-term performance of initial public 
offerings (IPOs). Relatedly, other scholars have discovered that firms that portray strangely high 




(Teoh et al., 1998; Yoon et al., 2015). The use of earnings management is considered an unethical 
practice and such manipulations could be deemed financial fraud. Use of accounting discretion is 
dishonest in the sense that the managers are distorting the economic reality of the firm to benefit 
management at the expense of other stakeholders. For instance, Greenfield et al. (2008) provided 
evidence on the relationship between earnings management implementation and proper ethical 
orientation. Likewise, Elayan et al. (2016) argued that changes in accruals were usually associated 
with corporate ethical rankings. Hence, the implementation of earnings management leads to 
unethical behavior, which leads not only to reputation destruction but also to significant legal 
issues. 
Firms with high stock price sensitivity with fewer earnings use cookie jar reserves and 
income smoothing to manage their earnings by giving more income to foundations as funding 
choices in the current year and increased revenues in the subsequent periods (Petrovits, 2006). 
Highlighting this manipulative practice, Mande et al. (2000) carried out a study on Japanese 
companies that had reductions in their research and development (R&D) during the 1990 
recession. The study reported that the reduction in the companies’ R&D during the recession 
indeed showed significant income-increasing behavior, which portrays the cutbacks as a signal of 
earnings management instead of ideal business decisions.  
Another incentive for management to manipulate earnings to meet contractual agreements 
is through debt covenant by the organization. Firms must raise their amount of debt to finance their 
operations or enter into debt contracts with financial institutions to get the debt to embark on capital 
expenditures (Alavi et al., 2008; Altman & Stoneberg, 2006; Hofstrand, 2013; Miloud & Alpes-
Savoie, 2014). The debt contract protects the lender against nonpayment by the borrower. DeFond 




reported debt covenant violations in annual reports from 1985 through 1988. The study employed 
both time-series and cross-sectional models of normal accruals. The results showed the existence 
of unusual total and working capital accruals in the year before the firms violated the debt 
covenants. These authors further explained that, in the year of violation, both models’ results 
showed negative abnormal total and working capital accruals. After controlling for fixed effects 
in the year of a breach, there were positive abnormal working capital accruals (Bhandari et al., 
2018; Cheng & Thomas, 2006; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Diaz & Martin, 2017; Shi & Zhang, 
2011). When the firm’s compensation contract tied to earnings provided incentives for managers, 
the managers manipulated accounting numbers out of self-interest (Guidry et al., 1999; Healy, 
1985; Holthausen et al., 1995; Man & Wong, 2013; Sun & Rath, 2008).  
A similar study by Franz et al. (2014) examined the effect of length of time of debt violation 
by firms on earnings management. The deterring nature of debt covenants inspires some executives 
to manage earnings to conform to the demands of the debt covenant and avoid the cost of default 
on the debt. Franz et al. (2014) further proposed that, comparatively, firms that are on the edge of 
defaulting on their debt obligations have stronger tendencies to use earnings management than 
firms that have a more extended period to fulfill their debt covenant. Firms that were closer to 
violating their debt obligation embarked on more aggressive accrual management than those that 
had a more extended period before breaking their debt covenants. This assumption was also 
supported by a number of other authors (Franz et al., 2014; Man & Wong, 2013; Rahman et al., 
2013; Sun & Rath, 2008). The use of earnings management by a TMT for opportunistic purposes 
may affect the authenticity of the firm’s financial statements, which may reduce the reliability, 




earnings management practice appears to be one of the most widely discussed topics in accounting 
science (Beaudoin et al., 2014; Elias, 2004; Kouaib & Almulhim, 2019).  
Diversity in TMT improves decision-making at the executive level and enhances the 
performance of a firm (Homberg & Bui, 2013). Equally, other authors have examined the impact 
of team heterogeneity on strategic decisions and hypothesized that teams with diverse backgrounds 
are more inclined to be ethical due to the prevalence of divergent ideas and inclusiveness in 
problem-solving (DeGrassi et al., 2012; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Rao & Tilt, 2016). In another 
addition to the literature, Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) examined nationality diversity and firm 
performance and also reported that TMT heterogeneity plays a significant role in the overall 
decision-making process. TMT members with diverse backgrounds tend to formulate viable 
strategic alternatives marked by a high degree of ethical standard (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Parola 
et al., 2015; Sila et al., 2016). However, firms tend to hire and retain employees who fit their 
personal preferences. This results in the employment of comparable workers, creating 
homogeneous groups that limit the ability of the company to deal with complex decision-making 
issues such as earnings quality (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Parola et al., 2015; Sila et al., 2016). 
Similarly, DeGrassi et al. (2012) proved that an executive team’s composition influences 
the amount, diversity, and value of resolutions it deems ethical. Hence, researchers agree that 
leadership diversity increases the quality of the decision-making process in the area of earnings 
management strategy, thereby playing a significant role in bringing the business strategically in 
line with better decision-making processes with current and future market movements (Qi et al., 
2018). In recent times, the reason for increasing diversity has been the necessity to include a 
broader range of talents. For instance, more than a third of companies (38%) surveyed by 




21% of surveyed companies implemented diversity improvements into their human resource 
strategies to address the requirements of new legislation. For instance, Sharma (2016) found that 
banks started to increase female participation on their boards mainly due to the necessity to address 
new laws. 
Nevertheless, the idea that diversity results in higher creativity, productivity, and efficiency 
in a workforce is continuously gaining popularity. Companies with implemented diversity 
strategies can maximize their potential and ensure a higher contribution from their employees to 
the business’s success (Patrick & Kumar, 2012). Similarly, heterogeneity in decision-making and 
problem-solving styles produce better results through the implementation of a broader range of 
perspectives and a more critical analysis of issues expressed by executives (Saeed, 2016). Gender 
diversity gained significant attention from scientists examining its impact on the efficiency of 
managing a business. For instance, researchers have suggested that diverse executive teams tend 
to undertake more socially desirable actions compared with all-male boards. Adam and Ferreira 
(2009) found that higher numbers of female executives are associated with higher ethical decision-
making, which results in higher efficiency (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Barua et al., 2010). 
Moreover, a survey by McKinsey (2018) showed that companies with diverse executive teams 
reported higher earnings before interest and tax levels compared with firms with only male 
executives. 
Similarly, Owen and Temesvary (2017) discovered that a higher share of women among 
bank executives led to better financial performance reported by companies. Additionally, Jizi and 
Nehme (2017) determined that companies’ stock volatility decreased after an increase in the 
participation of females on their boards, which could mainly be explained by the introduction of a 




on other factors, which also should be considered. For instance, Owen and Temesvary (2017) 
showed that, for low-capitalized banks, the introduction of gender diversity among top managers 
resulted in a decrease in return on assets. Contrary to this, other researchers have shown that well-
capitalized banks succeeded after increasing the gender diversity of the board, which can be 
explained by the overall better quality of management at such companies. Increasing the 
participation of females onboard also can result in several problems. Owen and Temesvary (2017) 
discovered that companies with 7% to 8% female executives tend to have higher communication 
costs, which decreases the efficiency of the top leaders’ activity.  
Leszczynska (2018) discovered a significant relationship between a company’s stock 
prices and its gender quota announcement. The researcher found that in these companies, female 
executives were comparatively younger than their male counterparts and, therefore, perceived as 
less experienced. Additionally, Leszczynska (2018) further showed that unlike firms that attracted 
outsiders on board, companies with female insider executives experienced a positive impact on 
their business performance.  
Other research has shown that, in addition to gender, the most widely recognized factors 
are education level, age, and tenure. This is especially important in the case of forming a TMT by 
a diversity principle. Others also have suggested or agreed that executive boards that include 
people of different ages, educational levels, and tenure are not able to gain positive outcomes to 
their business performance (Leszczynska, 2018). This could prove that executive diversity based 
on age, education level, and tenure may not be as efficient as gender diversity.  
The large number of corporate scandals in the 21st century, which includes Enron, Tyco, 
Hewlett-Packard, and WorldCom,  has left behind memories of ethics and diversity in 




collapse, resulting in the loss of stakeholders’ lifetime investments. According to some researchers 
(Beaudoin et al., 2014; DeGrassi 2012; Wan Mohammad et al., 2016), group diversity may be the 
key to ethical decision-making in the workplace. The study further pointed out that there is a need 
for multiple divergent views when a moral dilemma arises at a workplace, and a group with more 
diversity leads to more ethical decision-making. Hence, heterogeneous groups make more ethical 
decisions than homogenous groups (DeGrassi, 2012). The findings suggest that demographic 
diversity is an essential consideration for group decision-making involving ethical issues. Other 
studies also have stated that individuals from various backgrounds bring unique perspectives, 
experiences, and information to considering ethical issues that may be absent in homogenous 
groups. Furthermore, the results from several  studies showed that there is an increase in the 
performance of the diverse group over time (DeGrassi, 2012, Qi & Tian, 2012; Saona et al., 2019).  
The current study proposes that heterogeneous groups bring different attributes and 
personal experiences onboard, and heterogeneous groups are more likely to share information and 
develop new ideas that will result in ethical action regarding earnings management. Heterogeneous 
teams are composed of individuals with different attributes that impact their views on moral 
decision-making tasks like earnings management. This implies that if TMT members are not 
ethical they can manipulate the firm’s earnings to benefit the managers or the firm rather than the 
stakeholders/shareholders (owners’) interest. Firms with diverse TMTs are perceived to be genuine 
and are more likely to root out bad behavior, including indications of poor morals like earnings 
management or unethical accounting practices, than firms with  homogenous teams at the 
management level.  
A company with diversity sends a strong signal that the perception of ethicality depends 




the more ethical the team. This diversity subsequently diminishes the possibility of earnings 
management or any other unethical accounting practice (DeGrassi, 2012; Qi & Tian, 2012; Saona 
et al., 2019). Hence, in this study I propose that TMT diversity will moderate the relationship 
between capital or external contract motives and level of earnings management or any unethical 
accounting practices. I expect that the more diverse a firm’s TMT, the less unethical accounting 
behavior like earnings manipulation. I focus on variations in attributes of top managers’ diversity 
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Theories and Hypotheses Formulations 
Cognitive theory posits that expectations and emotions determine the behavior of human beings. 
This theory assumes that the individual remembers based on what they know, and so people will 
solve problems based on their memories of past experiences. Based on cognitive theory, 
accounting malpractices will diminish when accounting personnel perform their duties according 
to what is expected of them by top management (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011). The emotions 
of accounting personnel will guide their actions; they will act on what they feel is right or wrong. 
According to cognitive theory, people from different backgrounds based on the expectation and 
feelings, will not exaggerate financial information (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011).  
TMT diversity variables, such as gender, ethnicity, and education, will result in divergent 
opinions regarding accounting malpractice. These ideas will come from the variety of views in 
terms of individuals’ expectations and emotions. Thus, the right financial information will be 
reported based on what is right, which intend diminishes unethical accounting malpractice. 
Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) conceptual work on managerial qualities and organizational 
outcomes laid the basis for what has since become a significant stream in the field of research 
concerning heterogeneity and homogeneity in the upper echelons of management. Essentially, 
upper echelons theory argues that senior managers make strategic choices based on their cognitions 
and values and that the organizations they lead are reflections of their behaviors and preferences 
(Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Hambrick and Mason (1984) used upper echelons 
theory to explain how the demographic diversity of TMTs impact a firms’ outcomes. The conduct 
and personal attributes of TMTs influence financial reporting quality. Managers’ diversity in 
gender, tenure, education, age, and functional background are some features that also influence the 




making in accounting and finance can explain upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick 
& Manson, 1984).  
           Decision-making consists of numerous models in an organization (Courtney, 2001; Daft & 
Weick, 1984; Nutt, 1984; Sun & Naveh, 2004; Van de Ven & Ferry, 1980). The paths in the 
decision-making process include identification of formulation of a problem, followed by 
discovery, ratification, and possible solutions to the problem, and last, implementation of a 
solution. Each phase of the decision-making process will influence individual attributes, which is 
an integral part of ethics. Regarding earnings quality, ethics plays a crucial role in the TMT 
decision-making process (DeGrassi et al., 2012). 
The quality of earnings management depends on the efficiency of the decision-making 
process provided by the TMT. The senior management team includes persons who reside in the 
upper echelons of the organization, who are charged with the responsibility of managing the firm 
and setting its strategic agenda (Carpenter et al., 2003). The primary function of the executive 
board is to set the strategic direction for the firm’s daily operations. Due to their position at the top 
of the organizational hierarchy, senior management have the ability to misrepresent figures 
through earnings manipulations during the communication process with the company’s 
stakeholders (Wan Mohammad et al., 2016). Given the critical nature and importance of the 
executive board as the principal governing body of a firm and its mandate to make the day-to-day 
corporate decisions, many studies have focused on the link between TMTs and firm performance. 
Researchers have suggested that most variables of diversity (age, gender, culture, etc.) 
could have a significant impact on firm performance (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Parola et al., 2015; 
Sila et al., 2016; Talke et al., 2010). Hence, one of the main ideas in the literature is the assumption 




characteristics, such as gender, age, background, education level, and organizational tenure (Sila 
et al., 2016). Researchers also agree that leadership diversity could have an impact on earnings 
management (Adams et al., 2009; Elias, 2004). Therefore, there can be two opposite states of 
diversity in the TMT. The first state is closer to homogeneity (similarity) of the senior executive 
members. The second state is closer to heterogeneity (dissimilarity) of the company’s leaders. 
In this study I examine the diversity composition of the TMT’s either heterogeneous or 
homogenous group, which will make (un)ethical decisions in managing its firm’s earnings. The 
main focus of TMT diversity impact on earnings management is the decision-making process in 
homogenous and heterogeneous teams. The subject of homogeneity or heterogeneity of top 
executive teams has been of great interest to both academic researchers and managers. The 
psychological dimensions of cognition values and perceptions are difficult to measure directly. 
Hambrick (2007) recommended that future studies examine the observable background 
characteristics of all  TMT members. Pfeffer (1993) stated that the demographic composition of a 
group could result in variations in communication, cohesion, and integration depending on whether 
the TMT members aligned themselves to be similar to or dissimilar from the others in the group. 
Because of these studies, most upper echelons research has been conducted using demographic 
variables as proxies for cognitive capacities in attempts to comprehend the influence of TMT 
attributes on organizational processes and results.  
There appears to be some doubt as to the value of TMT diversity in the organizational 
setting. One line of reasoning suggests that TMT demographic diversity decreases internal 
cohesion, communication, consensus, social integration, and cooperation, and increases group 
identification. TMT demographic heterogeneity provides a variety of opinions and stimulates 




impact firm performance (Ararat et al., 2015; Parry, 2014; Shukeri, et al., 2012; Watson et al., 
1993). 
Smith et al. (1994) examined the effects of TMT demography and TMT processes (social 
integration, informality of communication, and frequency of discussion) on organizational 
performance in a sample of 53 hi-tech firms. The study found that TMT heterogeneity concerning 
industry experience was directly and negatively related to return on investment and sales growth. 
The study suggested that the more diverse the industry experience of TMT members, the more 
different the group, and thus the more effort required to coordinate and monitor strategic decisions, 
which would take the focus from the organization’s performance. Also, industrial heterogeneity 
may negatively relate to informal communication, which adversely affected TMT social 
integration.  
Attributes such as gender, education, age, and tenure of the top management impact 
organizational functioning and the strategic decisions of an organization, including regarding 
ethical issues like earnings management. Firm management has a critical role in the financial 
performance of the organization they are mandated to operate through the decision-making 
process, according to the upper echelons theory (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Furthermore, 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) mentioned that cognitive and behavioral attributes such as education 
and gender affect top management’s strategic choices, including ethical decisions like the earnings 
quality reporting process. Studies show that more observable traits such as education, background, 
and organizational tenure impact decision-making by the TMT (Sila et al., 2016). 
When top managers are faced with issues like managing earnings, they act based on their 
cognitions, values, and perceptions, which is the core idea of the upper echelons theory. The top 




their own attributes, such as their gender, education, and tenure. Hambrick (2007) stated that the 
upper echelons theory is in line with the limit of bounded rationality. However, since executives’ 
psychological constructs are difficult to measure the theory posits that observable characteristics 
such as gender, age, work experience, education, cultural background, and political affiliation are 
reasonable representations for the variances underlying their thoughts, values, and perceptions 
(Carpenter et al., 2004). Firm financial success, according to both researchers and practitioners, 
depends on leadership diversity. Management diversity plays a critical role in the strategic business 
decision-making process for current and future market movements (Qi et al., 2018). 
Capital Market Motives (Profitability, Return on Assets, Liquidity) 
For an organization to achieve the objective of improved short-term stock price 
performance, some managers have employed earnings management manipulation in the 
organization’s financial reports (Mangala, 2017). Due to the sensitivity of stock prices, investors 
evaluate the company’s market position by the earnings benchmarks. Unscrupulous managers, 
therefore, try to increase short-term stock prices by managing the earnings reported in the 
company’s financial statements. Most of this research was conducted at corporate events such as 
IPOs, seasoned equity offerings, and management buyouts (Samudhram et al., 2010; Teoh et al., 
1998a; Yoon et al., 2015).  
IPO firms are involved in more income-increasing earnings management activities than 
non-IPO firms. But the IPO firms show weak earnings and stock performance in subsequent years 
after such activities (Ahmad-Zaluki et al., 2011; Ahorany et al., 1993; Miloud, 2013). Recently, 
Maheshwari and Agrawal (2015) confirmed that graded IPOs indicate lower earnings management 
compared to non-graded IPOs. Also, earnings management is lower in the highest graded IPOs 




Firms revise their earnings upward around seasoned equity offerings to increase the value 
of the shares in the capital market and decline their earnings in later years due to the reversal of 
discretionary accruals (Caton et al., 2011; Daniel et al., 2008; Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998b). 
Rao and Dandale (2008) conducted a study with Indian firms that were undergoing the process of 
equity offerings and found that the firms overstated their earnings temporarily during the offerings. 
Similarly, some authors have found significant evidence that managers understated earnings before 
the announcement of a management buyout (Begley et al., 2003; Brown et al., 2009; Perry & 
Williams, 1994). Conversely, De Angelo (1986) did not find substantial evidence of 
understatement of revenues before management buyout.  
Another driver for companies to participate in earnings management is the desire to meet 
the expectations of stock market analysts, because investors often make decisions based on the 
analysts’ expectations. When managers’ bonuses are tied to the firm’s earnings, management may 
manipulate accruals either upward or downward to increase their compensation (Healy, 1985; 
Holthausen et al., 1995).  When the bonus is paid to the top executives after the level of earnings 
has reached the bonus cap, management may engage in income-decreasing earnings management 
or hold onto current earnings until the next period, since no additional bonus will be paid. The 
extra revenue is saved for a future bonus. The earnings-based bonus plan encourages top 
management to alter financial statements to boost their compensation (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et 
al., 1995). 
In a related study, Zhang (2009) stated that on average, CEOs who have long tenure with 
an organization report less aggressive earnings compared to CEOs with short tenure. Long-
tenure GEOs at the beginning of their term tend to inflate their earnings to build their reputation, 




Last-year earnings give the departing GEOs short-term benefits such as higher current period 
compensation and higher pension annuity. Dechow and Sloan (1991) reported that CEOs in the 
final years of their service spend less on research and development in order to increase their 
reported earnings, because their retirement benefits are based on the compensation received in 
their last years with the company.  
I will use performance measured by return on assets (ROA) in the regression model for 
this study, as good performance may lead to a low incentive to manage earnings (Doyle & Ge, 
2007a). I will examine performance using ROA calculated as net income divided by total assets 
(Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Ridge et al., 2014; Schmalensee, 1985).  
The use by some authors of ROA to control the effects of current performance on the 
creation of discretionary accruals has found a negative relationship between ROA and earnings 
management (Kothari et al., 2005; Wassimullah et al., 2010). Managers of poorly performing firms 
are more likely to engage in manipulation of earnings. Current performance from past may lead 
managers to use discretionary accruals. Taking these findings together, I propose the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypotheses for This Study 
Hypotheses—Direct Effects (ROA & Debt) and Earnings Management 
H1: There is a positive association between capital market motives (ROA) and earnings 
management.  
ROA: Measured by net income divided by lagged total assets at year-end. 





Debt: Measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets at year-end. 
Hypotheses—Moderating Variables and Earnings Management 
H3: TMT gender diversity will moderate the relationship between capital market motives (ROA) 
and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in conditions of 
higher variations of TMT gender diversity. 
H4: TMT gender diversity will moderate the relationship between external contact motives (debt) 
and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in conditions of 
higher variations of TMT gender diversity. 
H5: TMT knowledge diversity (education) will moderate the relationship between capital market 
motives (ROA) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in 
conditions of higher TMT knowledge diversity. 
H6: TMT knowledge diversity (education) will moderate the relationship between external contact 
motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in 
conditions of higher TMT knowledge diversity. 
H7: TMT values diversity (political affiliation and culture) will moderate the relationship between 
capital market motives (ROA) and the level of earnings management, such that this relationship 
will weaken in conditions of higher TMT values diversity. 
H8: TMT values diversity (political affiliation and culture) will moderate the relationship between 
external contact motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that this relationship 




H9: TMT risk diversity (age and tenure) will moderate the relationship between capital market 
motives (ROA) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in 
conditions of higher TMT risk diversity (age and tenure). 
H10: TMT risk diversity (age and tenure) will moderate the relationship between external contract 
motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in 
conditions of higher TMT risk diversity (age and tenure). 
External Contracts Motives (Financial Leverage [Debt]) 
 Lenders often enforce some financial limits in order to maintain a specified level of 
reported accounting figures and ratios that assure them a firm will repay its borrowings. Therefore, 
firms with a considerable portion of debt in their capital structure have an incentive to alter their 
accounting data using earnings management to avoid breaching their covenant. Dechow et al.’s 
(1996) study on some firms concluded that managers performed earnings management practices 
to prevent debt covenant restrictions and also to raise financing from external sources at low cost. 
Similarly, Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) examined a sample of 94 debt covenant violation firms 
and reported that the sampled firms used accruals to accelerate their earnings before the covenant 
violation year. Recently, Nagar and Sen (2016) revealed that financially distressed firms in India 
manipulated earnings to avoid defaulting on their debt obligations. Healey (1985) also theorized 
that a debt contract can prompt the selection of discretionary accounting policies. Zimmerman 
(1986) stated that executives are likely to pick income-increasing methods of accounting when 
their firms have high debt ratios.  
The debt covenant premise asserts that managers whose firms are closer to defaulting on 
their debt are more likely to shift their earnings from a future period to the current period. When 




practical terms, when firms see the potential of defaulting on their debt, they tend to manage their 
earnings to prevent debt violation. The above literature leads to the following proposed hypothesis: 
H2: External contract motives (debt) will positively be associated with earnings management. 
The next factor that is expected to have an impact on the quality of executives’ decisions 
is the length of the leader’s tenure. Researchers agree that length of tenure influences managers’ 
cognitive principles, and therefore affects earnings management strategy. Longer tenure allows the 
development of better communication and mutual understanding between senior managers, thus 
ensuring a lower level of conflict between them. For instance, Wiersema and Bantel (1992) 
discovered that the average executive tenure at companies that had gone bankrupt was 
comparatively shorter than the average executive tenure at organizations that were successful. 
Under these circumstances, leaders’ tenure serves as an indicator of the quality of the 
organizational experience. Hence, a positive relationship between the company’s success and its 
executives’ tenure explains the fact that the longer managers work as a team, the better they 
understand the company’s policies and procedures. Therefore, managers with longer tenure usually 
make fewer mistakes in their strategic decision-making process, which is also reflected in their 
earnings management strategy. 
An executive’s age is considered an essential factor that impacts the quality of strategic 
decisions. Older leaders tend to choose more conservative strategies, and thereby choose less risky 
approaches. Hence, older executives are steadier and implement a conservative strategies of 
earnings management. Prendergast and Stole (1996) explained this relationship between age and 
management style and stated that younger managers prefer to exhibit overconfidence in the 
organizational decision-making process, which consequently increases the level of earnings 




and prefer to choose more ethical steps to prevent the threat of affecting their status by 
manipulating earnings management practices. For moderating effects, more aged leaders would 
likely prefer to keep their reputation than receive a monetary reward. Also, as a result of their 
longer period working in the firm (tenure), they have already acquired wealth through bonuses and 
other compensation. Ali and Konrad (2017) supported this assumption and reported that older 
members of a TMT would not destroy their reputation for monetary rewards due to the fact that 
they had already acquired wealth through their longer service, as compared to relatively younger 
members of the TMT. Hence, an older TMT will not engage in unethical earnings management 
but rather will keep their hard-built reputation earned over years of service. To test the moderating 
effect of TMT risk diversity, the literature combined with upper echelons theory led to the 
following proposed hypotheses: 
H3: TMT risk diversity (age and tenure) will moderate the relationship between capital market 
(ROA) motives and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in 
conditions of higher TMT risk diversity (age and tenure). 
H4: TMT risk diversity (age and tenure) will moderate the relationship between external contract 
motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in 
conditions of higher TMT risk diversity (age and tenure). 
Ethical considerations are essential in a variety of accounting and business decisions. Not 
only will maintaining this focus avoid potential economic and legal costs due to the consequences 
of unethical behavior, it will also uphold the interests of the shareholders. Managers of public firms 
might manipulate earnings for their own dishonest, opportunist objectives. According to Frankie 
et al. (1997), gender differences play a significant role in ethical and economic decision-making. 




organizational settings. For instance, in the same organizational position, women are likely to act 
differently than men. Similarly, women are more likely to adopt ethical behavior than men.  
If a company’s financial information is distorted by false earnings reported on the financial 
statements, the external users are deceived, the information in the financial statements is less 
useful, and stakeholders’ resource allocation is affected (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Management 
has the ethical obligation and professional responsibility to report quality earnings in a reasonable 
manner in the interest of the stakeholders. 
Women tend to show higher ethical behavior and more socially desirable standards than 
their male counterparts in the same positions in organizational settings. Women are more ethical 
in the workplace and less likely to engage in unethical behavior to gain financial rewards (Frankie, 
1997). 
  Prior diversity literature suggests that most variables of diversity (age, gender, culture, etc.) 
positively or negatively impact a firm’s performance (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Parola et al., 2015; 
Sila et al., 2016; Talke et al., 2010). Carter et al. (2003) stated that the proportion of women on 
boards between Fortune 1000 firms and Tobin’s Q is positive and significant after controlling for 
size, industry, and other corporate governance measures. Heminway (2007) found that females are 
more truthful than men and are unlikely to manipulate corporate financial data and other 
disclosures. Peni and Vahamaa (2010) provided evidence that female CFOs participate in less 
earnings management than male CFOs. Females in a TMT may be more conservative than their 
male counterparts and, therefore, would not engage in unethical manipulations of earnings. The 
analysis of the literature concludes that factors such as gender, education, age, and tenure impact 
the process of earnings management. Prior research suggests that female executives are less risk-




Sharma, 2016). Females tend to make less aggressive decisions related to discretionary accruals 
and earnings management (Xiong, 2016). 
Women in leadership roles usually have better reputations than their male counterparts, 
and they prefer to choose more ethical behavior due to the threat of their status being affected by 
the implementation of earnings management practices. For moderating effects, women in 
leadership roles are more likely to keep their reputation over monetary rewards. Women tend to 
show higher desirable ethical standards than their male counterparts in the same positions in 
organizational settings. Women are more moral in the workplace and less likely to engage in 
unethical behavior to gain financial rewards (Frankie, 1997). Consequently, women will not 
engage in dishonest earnings management but will keep their hard-won good reputation. To test 
the moderating effect of TMT gender diversity, the literature combined with upper echelons theory 
leads to the following proposed hypotheses:  
H5: TMT gender diversity will moderate the relationship between capital market motives (ROA) 
and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in conditions of 
higher variations of TMT gender diversity.  
H6: TMT gender diversity will moderate the relationship between external contact motives (debt) 
and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in conditions of 
higher variations of TMT gender diversity. 
Further, the literature analysis allows us to discover that an individual’s education level 
also could contribute to the quality of top managers’ decisions regarding earnings management 
policies. Researchers agree that, to some extent, an individual’s level of education reflects their 




relatively higher education level have a more systematized knowledge system and produce more 
diverse thoughts on the range of existing business issues. Researchers believe that due to the high 
potential risk of earnings management activity, executives with a higher level of education will 
understand the potential severe consequences of such behavior, such as the multiple ethical issues 
it involves. As a result, it is assumed that better educated leaders will make more ethical decisions 
than their less-educated counterparts and prevent the practice of earnings management. Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1997) stated that holders of Master’s in Business Administration degrees are risk 
averse and also part of the business elite that values conformity and conventionality. Also, 
according to Bamber et al. (2010), CEOs with an accounting and business education are cautious 
and will not engage in earnings manipulation because it could ruin their reputation. These findings 
suggest that TMTs with diverse knowledge will keep their reputation rather than engage in the 
unethical accounting practices of managing earnings. Hence, to test the moderating effect of TMT 
knowledge diversity, the literature combined with upper echelons theory leads to the following 
proposed hypotheses:  
H7: TMT knowledge diversity (education) will moderate the relationship between capital market 
(ROA) motives and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in 
conditions of higher TMT knowledge diversity.  
H8: TMT knowledge diversity (education) will moderate the relationship between external contact 
motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship will weaken in 
conditions of higher TMT knowledge diversity. 
Researchers have also studied cultural diversity and its impact on earnings management 
practices. Qi and Tian (2012) believed that there is an interrelation between social values and 




indication of the accounting values and practices in that culture. In turn, culture influences bank 
lending, risk-taking, and earnings management behaviors in addition to accounting values and 
practices. In their survey, Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) suggested that cultural values have an impact 
on financial reporting practices in many firms across the globe. For instance, according to 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) there is a significant cultural influence on the lender’s risk-taking 
propensity and accounting conservatism. Researchers have discovered that individualism has a 
positive relationship with the lender’s risk-taking behavior and is negatively associated with 
accounting conservatism. Republican managers are expected to implement more conservative 
corporate strategies, which is consistent with their conservative individual ideologies (Hutton et 
al., 2015). Likewise, similar political ideologies may result in connections among people. The 
Republican Party espouses a cautious viewpoint, which implies fewer stages of leverage, less 
capital, fewer R&D disbursements, less risky investments, and higher profitability (Hutton et al., 
2015). 
Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) discovered that managers’ individual partisan preferences 
influence their investment decisions. Democratic mutual fund managers are likely to hold fewer 
of their portfolios in companies that are considered collectively irresponsible (e.g., tobacco, guns, 
defense firms, or companies with bad employee relations or diversity records) compared to other 
mutual fund managers who identify with the Republican party or no party at all. Given the 
connection between personal philosophy and political choice and the association between personal 
philosophy and fiscal conservatism, we can presume political decisions and economic 
conservatism to be related. As a result, fiscal conservativeness, as revealed through political 




Likewise, while managers endeavor to maximize stockholder value, variety in political 
choice could lead to the exact opposite in understanding regarding downside risk and growth 
opportunities. This reasoning does not inevitably imply an agency problem but merely posits that 
managers’ personality traits influence their decisions (Hutton et al., 2014). 
Meanwhile, due to their more conservative character traits, Republican managers are likely 
to be more risk-averse and debt-averse than Democratic or moderate managers in their financial 
decisions. Consequently, Republican managers may be more prudent in their use of debt 
investment and in engaging in risky activities, including earnings management (Hutton et al., 
2015). Republican managers will likely keep their reputation with their values than engage in 
unethical manipulation earnings for personal gain. Hence, to test the moderating effect of TMT 
values diversity literature combined with upper echelons theory, I propose the following 
hypotheses: 
H9: TMT values diversity (political affiliation and culture) will moderate the relationship between 
capital market motives (ROA) and the level of earnings management, such that this relationship 
will weaken under conditions of higher TMT value diversity. 
H10: TMT values diversity (political affiliation and culture) will moderate the relationship 
between external contact motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that this 
relationship will weaken under conditions of higher TMT value diversity. 
Researchers agree that executive boards that include people of different ages, educational 
levels, and tenure can achieve positive outcomes in business performance (Leszczynska, 2018). 




diversity created by gender. Consequently, in this research I focus on the moderating effect of 










The financial data I used for this study was collected from the Compustat databases for the 
S&P 500 publicly traded firms  for the years 2008 to 2018. I used data from this period in order to 
measure the earnings behavior of firms during the meltdown and post-recession periods. The key 
variables for each firm include sales, assets, gross property and plant depreciation, accounts 
receivable, accounts payable, total assets, current assets, and current liabilities. I collected the top 
management team (TMT) personal characteristics from the Boardex database. The study 
parameters proxying for the top management category are the senior, mostly highly paid officers 
who are also responsible for signing off on financials to external users. The data for the profile 
diversity of the TMT I collected manually from the Bordex database, which contains information 
on age, gender, education, professional background, and employment history. The political 
affiliation data came from a website called opensecrets.org. I assessed the TMT diversity variables 
of gender, age, and tenure as proxies for (risk diversity), political affiliations and cultural diversity 
as proxies for (values diversity), and educational background as proxy for knowledge diversity for 
the moderating variables. I examined gender diversity as the number of women to men in the TMT. 
For education I looked at the level of knowledge of each senior management and how that can 
impact decisions on earnings management. Education level (knowledge diversity) measures the 




indicates the top management person’s original place of birth, using the country where they 
received their bachelor’s degree as a proxy for country of birth.  
Earnings Management Techniques 
Earnings management occurs when managers choose in their financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p. 365). There are two main 
types of methods managers use to manipulate the results of financial reports.  
Accrual-Based Earnings Management  
Accruals refers to one of the earnings management techniques commonly used by 
executives to manage earnings outcomes. Accruals are the difference between the net cash inflow 
from a firm’s operating results and the profit reported in the firm’s income statement, which may 
be either nondiscretionary or discretionary (Mas et al., 2018). According to Dechow and Skinner 
(2000), accrual management of earnings refers to changing accounting methods or making 
estimates within the generally accepted accounting principles. Hence, changes to the accrual 
process are performed by an executive with opportunistic aims and cover various estimates and 
assessments. For instance, Barton (2001) examined the use of derivatives and discretionary 
accruals as a means of managing earnings. The study found that management can use hedging by 
smoothing cash flows, by either decreasing or increasing accrual. Barton’s (2001) survey showed 
that firms with lower absolute levels of discretionary accruals with derivative portfolios partially 
substitute derivatives and discretionary accruals for earnings smoothing. Therefore, after the end 




management can be detected by auditors and regulators (Mas et al., 2018), which causes future 
problems for the company. 
Dependent Variables. In this study I use a modified cross-sectional Jones model to 
properly discover the relationship between diversity characteristics and earnings management. 
My choice of this model is based on prior research by Dechow et al. (1995). In their paper, they 
evaluated several accrual-based models for detecting earnings management and found that the 
modified cross-sectional Jones model is the most powerful method of detecting earnings 
management. More recently, additional researchers have also used the modified cross-sectional 
Jones model in their respective studies (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Klein, 2002; Roychowdhury, 


















+ εit  (1) 
where i is the company; t is the year; TA is total accruals, measured as the difference between 
income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows; A is total assets; CFO is cash flow 
from operations, ΔREV is a change in company revenue; PPE is firm i’s gross property plant and 
equipment; and εit is the error term. 
Real Earnings Management  
The next earnings management type is real earnings management, which includes changes 
in real activities. According to Mas et al. (2018), to manage earnings means to change the time or 
structure of operations, investments, and financial decisions. Hence, this type of earnings 
management includes manipulation of real activity to gain specific outcomes. There are several 




is performed by managers to temporarily increase sales during a given, and thereby report high 
revenue for that period. For instance, managers may offer excessive product price discounts or 
provide more favorable credit terms than usual, increasing the sales volume and profit for that 
period (Roychowdhury, 2000). The second way involves the reduction of discretionary expenses. 
Earnings can be managed by increasing inventory production and, thereby, reducing the cost of 
goods sold. Also to decrease discretionary expenses, a company could cut costs on research and 
development (R&D), maintenance, advertising, or general and administrative expenses, especially 
in periods where such expenditures do not directly lead to revenue and profits (Bereskin et al., 
2017). Finally, the company could also engage in overproduction, which causes the fixed cost per 
unit of product to be lower (Mas et al., 2018). The higher production level allows for improving 
the company’s profit margins by keeping discretionary spending down. In these ways, the 
implementation of the real earnings management technique can help the company to temporarily 
grow its sales and profit during a given period. 
These manipulations cause significant barriers for auditors and regulators to detect any 
changes conducted using real earnings management (Bereskin et al., 2017), and it is more easily 
disguised as a regular business activity (Mas et al., 2018). However, these steps could have adverse 
effects in the long term, such as decrease in capital investment, decrease in future cash flow, 
reduction of R&D expenses, reduction of marketing costs, and increased price discounts. 
Therefore, although it improves the company’s cash flow and profits in the current period, the real 
earnings management strategy reduces its future cash flow. 
Measuring Real Earnings Management. To measure real earnings management, Xiong 



















+ +εit  (2) 
where i is the firm; t is the year; PROD is the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change in 
inventory; SALE is the firm’s sales turnover; and A is the firm’s total assets.  
The next indicator of the model for calculating the level of real earnings management 










+ εit (3) 
where the EXPENSE indicator illustrates expenses for selling and administration. 
The third indicator of the Xiong (2016) model covers the abnormal operating cash flow 
estimation. According to the author, the abnormal operating cash flow estimation can be conducted 
using the following determinants: Translating these earnings management proxies into measurable 
models, following Roychowdhury (2006) by first running the following regression to determine 












+  εit (4) 
where CFO is the operating cash flow. 
Hence, on the basis of the previously illustrated equations, the model for assessing the 
overall effects of real earnings management can be expressed by the following formula: 




The interpretation of the model results is because the higher value of REM illustrates a lower level 
of real earnings management. 
Measurement of Variables for Earnings Management. In this study I tested financials 
to detect earnings management by employing discretionary accrual and real earnings 
management used in the earnings management literature. Accrual-based earnings management 
seeks to hide actual economic performance by changing accounting methods or estimates within 
the generally accepted accounting principles (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). Conversely, real 
earnings management alters the execution of real business transactions (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Accrual-based earnings management occurs at the end of the financial period, while real earnings 
management is an ongoing process throughout business transactions. 
Because managers are able to manipulate income and balance sheet amounts to move 
earnings between periods, researchers must focus on the discretionary part of total accruals 
(Jelinek, 2007). The earnings management literature has several models to measure discretionary 
accruals. The Healy (1985) model assumes that discretionary accruals are equal to total accruals, 
as managers engage in earnings management in each reporting cycle. The Ronen and Sadan (1981) 
model tests how firms engage in smoothing their reported earnings to minimize fluctuation of 
earnings. Their model assesses the correlation between operating income and time. The DeAngelo 
(1986) model uses prior period total accruals scaled by lagged total assets to test for 
nondiscretionary accruals. This model assumes that the nondiscretionary part of the total accrual 
remains continuous (constant). The Jones model (1991) concludes that nondiscretionary accruals 
are not constant but can vary with changing economic situations. 
Prior studies of earnings management have used discretionary accruals as a means of 




study I employed the modified Jones model (1991) used by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994). This is 
in line with other studies (Dechow et al., 2010; Defond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Healy & Wahlen, 
1999) that measured the difference in net income before extraordinary item and cash flow as total 
accrual. GVI codes were used to regress complete accrual changes and all the firm’s level of plant, 
property, and equipment. 
 
where TACit represents total accrual for firm i during the year; Ait represent total assets for the 
year for the firm; REVit shows the difference in sales between year t-1 and year t for firm I; and 
PPEit denotes plant, property, and equipment for organization i in year t.  
Regression coefficients from Equation (1) are used to calculate the nondiscretionary 
accrual, (NDA), and modified change in sales is found by subtracting the difference in account 
receivables (RECit), as shown in Dechow et al. (1995): 
. 
Discretionary accrual (DA) as the residual is then calculated following Dechow et al. 
(1995):          
            
I used the absolute discretional accrual (AB_DA) as the dependent variable. This method 
has been used in prior studies for detecting earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995; Defond & 




Other authors have employed performance-matched discretionary accrual as their measure 
of management of earnings (Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005). Francis (2004) stated 
that the impact of earnings management could affect a firm’s precise operation and financial 
qualities. This study used control variables like firm size, leverage, book to market value, operating 
loss, and sales growth. The study control for industry effect due to macroeconomic conditions has 
the potential of skewing the results (Dechow et al., 1995; Defond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev, 
2002; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Kothari et al., 2005). 
Measurement of TMT Diversity Attributes (Moderating Variables) 
For this study I used the Blau index as the method for diversity measurement, consistent 
with prior literature (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Krishnan & Park, 2005). Since gender, education, 
and functional background are categorical variables, the Blau index is used for the analysis. To 
provide a consistent measure of within-group heterogeneity I used diversity variables such as 
gender, job, tenure with current company, total tenure, political affiliation, and culture, following 
the approach of Miner et al. (2003) and using Blau’s index (also known as Teachman’s index; 
Teachman, 1980). Blau’s index represents the proportion of TMT members in the category and k 
represents the number of TMT diversity attributes to measure the categorical differences between 
the group members: 
𝐵 =  1 −  ∑ 𝑃𝑖^2𝑘𝑖=1 ,  
where 𝑃𝑖 represents the proportion of TMT members in the 𝑖th category and k represents the 
number of TMT diversity attributes to measure the categorical differences between the group 
members.  
I used TMT risk diversity proxy (composite of age and tenure), the variations of female 




as proxy and TMT values diversity proxy (composite of political affiliations and culture), 
Democrat or Republican. Blau’s index is widely used in the measure of heterogeneity for diversity 
and has also been used in prior research (Wieserma & Bantel, 1992). 
  Blau’s index is calculated by adding the squared proportions of the TMT members 
categorically and summing them up, then subtracting from 1. The minimum value of Blau’s index 
is 0, and the maximum value always depends on the number of categories (ί) of a particular variable 
of interest. The maximum variable can be computed as (ί – 1)/ί where ί represents the number of 
TMT categories (Korff et al., 2009). When TMT diversity increases, the value of Blau’s index 
increases. Theoretically, this means that the maximum value of Blau’s index increases with higher 
qualitatively different categories. 
My purpose in this study is to contrast the diverse demographics of TMTs across firms and 
to make comparisons. Therefore, I standardized the indices to permit contrasts among the groups 
by dropping the bloating effects on group size as well as within group size. The maximum value 
of the group diversity measurement is a function of group size and distribution of members. All 
normalized or standardized indices range from 0 to 1 (Korff et al., 2009). 
I developed the coefficient of variation is by dividing the standard deviation of the risk 
diversity of the TMT members by the mean values of the TMT risk diversity. A high coefficient 
of variation indicates increased heterogeneity in terms of risk diversity. As a continuous variable, 
I calculated TMT risk diversity as the coefficient of variation using standard deviation, as 
documented in prior literature. The measurements of the difference was firm by firm to capture 




The coefficient of variation was developed by dividing the standard deviation of the ages 
of TMT members by the mean values of the ages of TMT members. A high coefficient of variation 
indicates increased heterogeneity in terms of risk diversity (age and tenure). As a continuous 
variable, I measured TMT diversity as the coefficient of variation using standard deviation, as 
documented in prior literature. The calculation of the diversity was done firm by firm to capture 
the yearly effects within each organization (Miner et al., 2003). 
Hypothetically, this means that the maximum value of Blau’s index increases with higher 
qualitatively different categories. The number of theoretical maxima for each diversity variable 
was derived and is shown in Table 1 below: 
Table 1 
The Theoretical Maximum Possible Values of the Diversity Variable Based on Blau’s Index
 
As noted in Table 1, the theoretical maximum of Blau’s index for gender is 0.5, whereas 
the maximum value for cultural diversity is 0.67. These noted differences between the variables 
are only comparable when removed and corrected for these differences, and this was achieved by 
Diversity variable Categories (ί) Theoretical maximum
Gender 2 0.50
Cultural diversity 3 0.67
Job diversity 3 0.67
Current tenure 3 0.67
Total tenure 4 0.75
Age 4 0.75
Education 3 0.67
Political affiliation 3 0.67




standardizing Blau’s index (B). The preferred statistical approach for this correction is detailed in 
Agresti and Agresti’s (1978) index of qualitative variation, in which they multiplied Blau’s index 
(B) by the maximum ί/(ί – 1) to get a standardized value that ranges from 0 to 1. 
Research Design (Statistical Method) 
For the I research estimated the models using generalized estimating equations (GEEs; 
Liang & Zeger, 1986), which is consistent with previous research on outcomes like CEO 
narcissism (Petrenko et al., 2015). This estimation technique derives maximum likelihood 
estimates while controlling for nonindependence of observation; the TMT variables are the 
moderating variables on earnings management. In prior research on earnings management using 
the cross-sectional version of the Jones model (1991), at least 10 observations were used for the 
regression. 
To identify the moderating effect of TMT diversity on the relationship between capital 
motives/external contract motives and the level of earnings management, I used the GEE method 
in this study. I also tested the hypotheses using the following three regressions: 
 𝐸𝑀=𝛽0+ 𝛽1capitalmotives+𝛽2externalcontactmotives + ControlVar+ 𝜀          
𝐸𝑀=𝛽0+𝛽1capitalmotives+𝛽2externalcontactmotives+𝛽3TMTRISK𝐴𝐶+𝛽4TMTValues𝐴𝐶+𝛽5TMTgender𝐴𝐶
+𝛽6TMTKNOWLEDGE𝐴𝐶 ControlVar+ 𝜀                                               
𝐸𝑀=𝛽0+(𝛽1capitalmotives+𝛽2externalcontactmotives)* 
(𝛽3TMTRISK𝐴𝐶+𝛽4TMTValues𝐴𝐶+𝛽5TMTgender𝐴𝐶+𝛽6TMTKNOWLEDGE𝐴𝐶)+𝛽11 ControlVar+ 𝜀       
𝛽0 represents the fixed intercept 𝛽1and 𝛽2 and are the average independent variables of the 
fixed slope on the earnings management across the firms, 𝛽3 𝛽4, 𝛽5, 𝛽6, 𝛽7, 𝛽8, 𝛽9 and 𝛽10 quantify the 
effect of moderations on the fixed slopes. The variable 𝐸𝑀 is the proxy for earnings management 
that influences earnings quality. The variable 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the firm’s profitability and was measured 




is a proxy for financial leverage, calculated as the ratio of the total debt to total assets at year-end. 
The variable 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 is a proxy for liquidity, which was calculated by receivables plus inventory 
minus accounts payable divided by total assets. Capital market motives (ROA and liquidity) and 
external contract motives (financial leverage-debt) multiplied by TMT diversity variables 
represent the interaction between TMT diversity and financial leverage, ROA and liquidity 
respectively. The variable 𝜀 represents the residual variance not explained by the independent 
variables captured by the model. The moderating effect of TMT diversity is detected from the 
fixed slopes 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝛽5, 𝛽6, 𝛽7, 𝛽8, 𝛽9, and 𝛽10.  I expect the moderating fixed slopes to be 
significant.  
Control Variables  
   To test the hypotheses, I included several control variables: performance measured by 
return on assets, growth measured by revenue growth, operating cycle of the firm, revenue 
volatility, firm size, industry, and cash flow from operation volatility. I controlled the variable 
“growth,” as some studies have determined that high-growth firms have more earnings 
management opportunities than low-growth firms (Richardson & Sloan, 2005). I also controlled 
revenue volatility, cash flow volatility, and operating cycle, as these variables are well-known to 
impact the magnitude of discretionary accruals.  Firms that exhibit high volatile revenue, high 
volatile cash flow, and longer operating cycles have a greater tendency to manage accruals 
(Dechow & Dichev, 2002). Additionally, I controlled solvency ratio. I added this ratio because it 
measures the ability of an enterprise to meet its debts and other obligations and indicates if the 









Model and Estimation  
In my research I estimated the models using generalized estimating equations (GEE; Liang 
& Zeger, 1986) consistent with previous research on outcomes like CEO narcissism (Petrenko et 
al., 2015). This estimation technique derives maximum likelihood estimates while controlling for 
nonindependence of observations in the panel data used in the analysis.   
The top management team (TMT) variables are the moderating variables on earnings 
management. In prior research on earnings management, a cross-sectional version of the Jones 
model (1991) with at least 10 observations was used for the regression. The study used the three-
digit code in order not to eliminate firms. The dependent variable was a discretionary accrual 
estimated using the GEE model. My research explores the effect of the moderating variables 
(TMT) on the calculated discretionary accruals. Thus, the discretionary accrual is regressed 
individually on the moderating variables. I used Hypotheses 1 and 2 for testing for the main effects 
(ROA and leverage), with the signed values of discretionary accruals utilized with the independent 
variables (ROA and debt) in the model. ROA is calculated as net income divided by lagged total 
assets at year-end. Leverage is calculated as total debt (both short and long) divided by total assets 
(debt ratio). The purpose of this process is to investigate whether accruals are managed downward 
or upward for performance (ROA) and leverage (debt) purposes. I used the natural log of debt for 





Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
This section of the study discusses sample descriptive statistics, followed by my 
hypotheses test results. 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for selected income and balance items for the 
sample of S&P 500 firms in the United States. All variable definitions are shown in Appendix D. 
The statistical measure in Panel A has not been truncated. Therefore, the data used to calculate the 
measure includes outlier observations. The mean revenue of the firms in the sample is $198.50 
million. The maximum revenue in the sample is $512,000 million, and the minimum is $39.19 
million. The median revenue for the firms is $77.02 million. The mean net income of the firms is 
$16.07 million, and the maximum and minimum net income are $105,000 and $30.900 million, 
respectively. While some firms suffered losses, 95% or less of firms in the sample had net income 
equal to or less than $72.64 million. Most of the firms showed signs of profitability. The impact 
of leverage (debt) on earnings management is one of the main effects of the hypotheses for the 
study. Panel A shows that the mean long-term debt for the sample is $96.11 million. The minimum 
and maximum long-term debts are $0 and $377,317 million, respectively. The firms had total 
assets mean and median of $576.25 million and $145.01 million, respectively.  
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. I 
transformed the continuous variables (Dacc, ABDacc, and debt) to remove any outliers from the 
estimation model. The absolute mean value of discretionary accruals and the signed value of 
discretionary accruals (Dacc) are consistent with previous earnings management research. The 
mean absolute discretionary accrual is 0.24 with a minimum value of 0.000. The mean signed 
value of discretionary accrual is 0.00009. Debt is one of the main effects tested with earnings 




debt divided by lagged total assets. The mean debt of 6.3 serves as an avenue to examine the impact 
of external contracts motives (financial leverage [debt]) on earnings management in the publicly 
traded firms. 
Panel C shows the moderating variables that are the diversity attributes. In this study, the 
moderating variables are age, tenure, political affiliation, culture, gender, and education. I utilized 
Blau’s index for variations with the TMT attributes, grouping the characteristics into four 
moderating variables. The TMT attributes (moderating variables) are risk diversity (a composite 
of the standardized Blau’s mean of age and tenure); values diversity proxy (a composite of the 
standardized Blau’s mean of political affiliation and culture); gender diversity; and knowledge 
(education) diversity. Risk diversity has a mean of 0.34. The minimum and maximum for the 
standardized Blau’s index for all the moderating variables are 0 and 1, respectively. The values 
diversity mean is 0.25 and the knowledge diversity mean is 0.42. 
 Panel D represents the descriptive statistics for firm features used as control measures 
(variables) in the model. Revenue change has a mean of $632.02 million; that is the average 
increase in revenue for the firms, which shows that firms’ revenue can increase significantly over 
time. The standard deviation of $70.43 shows how wide the variation in revenue change is from 
one firm to another. The operating cycle (OpeCycle) mean is 6.29 days, with minimum and 
maximum operating cycles of 4.69 and 14.78 days, respectively. Some firms tend to have shorter 
operating cycles than others. Firm size is the natural log of total assets, which is consistent with 
prior studies in the earnings management literature. Sales volatility and cash flow volatility are the 
standard deviations of cash flow and sales from operations over at least the last three years as 




Panel E represents the correlation matrices between the dependent variables, independent 
variables, moderating variables, and control variables. In this section I discuss the relationships 
among the different diversity variables, followed by a discussion of the correlations between 
earnings management and the diversity variables. Finally, I examine the correlations between the 
control variables and the various diversity variables. The correlations that are significant at least 
at a minimum 5% level of significance are indicated with an asterisk (*).  
Cohen (1988) stated that a correlation of 0.322 is considered moderately strong based on a 
benchmark that suggests that correlation coefficients within the range of 0.1 to 0.23 equates to 
weak, 0.24 to 0.36 equates to moderately strong, and = > 0.37 equates to strong. Also indicated in 
Panel E is the correlation between the moderating variables of value diversity and risk diversity. 
The associated correlation coefficient is 0.3340, and it is significant at least at the 5% level, which 
is moderately strong. Also, there is a correlation between the moderating variables of gender and 
values diversity. The correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.0539, and it is both 
positive and significant, at least at the 5% level. Knowledge diversity and gender diversity also 
show positive significant correlation, and the associated correlation coefficient is 0.1235. While 
there were moderate correlations between a few of the diversity variables, the relationships 
between most of the diversity variables were very low, as shown in Panel E.  
Overall, these diversity variables achieve different dimensions of diversity, so they have 
no multicollinearity with each other. The absolute discretionary accruals and signed discretionary 
accruals correlate with ROA, which is one of the main variables used in this study to detect 
earnings management. ROA and discretionary accrual (Dacc) have a correlation coefficient of 
0.1020, which is positive and significant at the 5% level. ROA and absolute discretionary accrual 




correlated positively with ROA with a coefficient of 0.1078, significant at the 5% level. The 
moderating variable gender is positively correlated with signed discretionary (Dacc) with a 
coefficient of 0.0374, which is significant at the 5% level. Values diversity, a moderating variable, 
is positively correlated with absolute discretionary accrual with a coefficient of 0.0473, which is 
significant at the 5% level. The control variables firms’ size positively correlated with the 
moderating variables risk, value, gender, and knowledge diversity with coefficients of 0.0557, 
0.1361, 0.0331, and 0.0832 respectively, and they are significant at the 5% level, though their 
correlation is weak. Other controls’ pairwise correlation with the moderating variables is low; there 
is no issue of multicollinearity with the moderating variables and the control variables. 
Multicollinearity issues can be identified by the use of the correlation’s matrix. When there is 
multicollinearity between independent variables, two or more independent variables will show 
high correlations, above 0.80, which can impact the dependent variable (Blalock, 1963). 
Multicollinearity can result in deceiving the adjusted R2 since the standard error for the 
regressions’ coefficients will be artificially high (Tillenius & Lango, 2018). Pairwise correlation 
coefficients above |0.8| would show the existence of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003, p. 387). As 







Panel B  
 
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
      
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% Min. Max. 
Dacc 3564 0.0000939 0.0401588 -0.05968 -0.01545 1.39E-17 0.0166083 0.0563937 
-
0.4429644 0.2618223 
ABDacc 3564 0.0249511 0.0314643 2.78E-17 0.004781 0.016012 0.0334 0.0800776 0.00 0.4429644 
ROA 5530 0.0541909 0.0804988 -0.02 0.009852 0.050443 0.092 0.1672157 -1.226993 0.7690744 
Debt 6577 6.399576 3.587189 000.00 5.494595 7.739278 8.837667 10.19821 -4.017384 12.84037 
Liquidity  5530 -145199 0.1713045 -0.26256 -0.07122 -0.00475 0.036099 0.200226 
-
0.8797287 0.935973 
   
Panel A  
 
Descriptive Statistics for Selected Financial Data (in Millions) of the Sample     
           
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% Min. Max. 
Revenue 5,529 19,850.25 38,776.17 1,052.17 3,263.65 7,705.00 17,265.00 88,275.00 3.919 511,729.00 
Net Income 4,739 1,607.33 4,235.81 -313.71 250.56 602.75 1,574.00 7,264.00 -30860 104,821.00 
Current Assets 4,574 7,657.70 13,047.73 553.13 1,578.90 3,251.55 7,768.00 31,322.58 30.933 169,662.00 
Current Liabilities 4,582 5,601.31 9,924.75 278.78 933.80 2,305.23 5,531.00 23,072.00 17.579 116,866.00 
Gross PPE 5,364 7,951.70 18,605.93 67.49 494.13 1,674.04 7,967.43 32,515.00 0.00 252,668.00 
Total Assets 5,530 57,625.76 
2,000,315.





Short-Term Debt 5,485 4,253.43 28,371.51 0.00 15.96 242.00 945.00 7,711.00 0.00 449,196.00 
Long-Term Debt 
(Current) 4,663 1,159.84 2,473.91 17.61 165.70 411.60 1,088.00 4,611.00 0.00 44,667.00 
Long-Term Debt 5,514 9,682.51 26,882.35 0.18 1,066.90 3,307.10 8,259.00 30,053.00 0.00 377,138.00 
Cash Operations 4,736 3,027.13 6,284.17 162.67 547.99 1,180.20 2,915.70 11,954.00 -45951 96,143.00 















Descriptive Statistics for Moderating Variables      
           
  N Mean Std. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% Min. Max. 
Age 4933 0.33568 0.36417 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.6666667 0.9375 0.00 1.00 
Tenure 4933 0.3360137 0.349372 0.00 0.00 0.296264 0.6666667 0.8571429 0.00 1.00 
Risk Diversity (Age, Tenure) 4933 0.3423 0.284812 0.00 0.00 0.333333 0.6145833 0.795 0.00 1.00 
Political Affiliation 4933 0.2840864 0.3655377 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.6666667 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Culture 4933 0.1509144 0.3055263 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.8888889 0.00 1.00 
Values Diversity (Political 
Affiliation and Culture) 4933 0.2253201 0.2593993 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.375 0.744898 0.00 1.00 
Gender 4933 0.2102999 0.3309404 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.5555556 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Knowledge Diversity (Education) 4933 0.4248223 0.3545696 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.72 0.9375 0.00 1.00 
           
Panel D 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
        
  N Mean Std. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% Min. Max. 
Revchg 4,639 632.99 7,034.59 -2,456.36 -42.67 277.62 1,003.10 5,417.00 
-
172,892.00 91,948.00 
OpeCycle 6,577 6.29 1.54 4.52 4.52 6.23 7.24 8.98 4.52 13.40 
Cash Flow 
Volatility 4,675 655.31 2,194.19 29.36 89.70 208.32 536.62 2,325.30 2.12 84,405.92 
Firm Size 5,530 9.65 1.44 7.55 8.64 9.58 10.49 12.18 4.69 14.78 





 Panel E          
 Correlation Matrix for All Variables         
 Dacc 
ABDa




















Dacc 1              
ABDacc 
-
0.1175* 1             
ROA 0.1020* 
-
0.0818* 1            
Debt -0.0139 0.0154 
-
0.1078* 1           
Liquidity 0.0622* -0.0197 0.0331* 0.1224* 1          
RiskDiv 0.0238 -0.0265 0.019 -0.0028 0.0114 1         
ValueDiv 0.0178 0.0473* 0.0041 0.0675* 
-
0.0560* 0.3340* 1        
Gender 0.0374* -0.0218 0.0184 0.0027 
-
0.0554* 0.0995* 0.0539* 1       
Knol Div 0.0018 -0.0154 -0.0264 0.0342* -0.0278 0.4858* 0.4698* 0.1235* 1      
Firm Size -0.0014 0.0304 
-
0.1956* 0.5673* 0.0338* 0.0553* 0.1361* 0.0331* 0.0832* 1     
Oper Cycle -0.0141 0.0457* 0.0693* 0.2919* 0.1971* -0.0267 0.0783* -0.0137 0.0083 0.4692* 1    
SalesVolatity 
-
0.0454* -0.0011 -0.0024 0.1384* -0.0222 -0.0271 0.0600* 0.0053 0.0344* 0.3010* 0.2857* 1   
Cashflow 
-
0.0569* 0.0670* -0.0149 0.4769* 0.0514* -0.014 0.0705* 0.0066 0.0435* 0.3720* 0.3270* 0.5385* 1  




0.0442* 0.0391* -0.0232 -0.019 0.0638* 0.0576* 0.0075 0.0851* 1 
               
               




Regression Results Showing the Effects of ROA and Debt on Earnings Management 
Table 2 shows the base model of the result for Hypotheses 1: Capital market motives 
(ROA) will be positively associated with earnings management (discretionary accruals). The 
empirical results where the dependent variable is Dacc and the independent variable is ROA shows 
the coefficient ROA is positive and significant (0.057, p < 0.00), which strongly supports 
Hypothesis 1. I examined performance using ROA as a measure of performance, calculated as net 
income divided by total assets (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Ridge et al., 2014; Schmalensee, 1985).  
Kothari et al. (2005) and Wassimullah et al. (2010) used ROA to control the effects of 
current performance on the creation of discretionary accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) found a 
negative relationship between ROA and earnings management. Managers of poorly performing 
firms are more likely to engage in manipulation of earnings. Current performance from past may 
result in managers using discretionary accruals. 
I hypothesized interaction and applicable measure of performance; in the study I portray 
the projected impacts of the firm’s performance by TMT choices through their attributes indicated 
in the research. Firms manipulate earnings upwards as a sign of good performance, which makes 
them look appealing to investors and shareholders alike.  
Discretionary Accruals—Regression Results Main Effects Using GEE Analysis 
In this study I utilized GEE (Liang & Zeger, 1986) for the analysis because of the low 
variance expected in the moderation effects over time. 
The outcome of TMT variables may not significantly change across the years, as previously 
reported by Petrenko et al. (2015) in their study on corporate social responsibility, or CEO 
narcissism. The moderating analysis consists of three steps. First, I estimated the unmoderated 




second regression by incorporating the moderating variable into the model, as shown in Table 1C. 
Finally, I estimated the third moderated relationship by adding the interaction term. For the study 
in controlling the effects of a moderating variable I used the GEE analytical approach to maintain 
the integrity of the sample, which resulted in modifying the form of the relationship displayed in 
the results from these three steps. I used GEE panel data methodologies to estimate the models in 
the results. Additionally, I performed controls of variables for the existence of undetected fixed 






















Table 2: GEE Regressions Test Results (Main Effects) on H1 and H2  
DAcc=𝛽0+ 𝛽1ROA+𝛽2Debt  
Regression Results  
  
Table 3 shows the base model for Hypothesis 2. External contract motives (debt) will be 
positively associated with earnings management (GEE analysis), the empirical results where the 
dependent variable is Dacc and the independent variable is debt. The results show the coefficient 
debt is positive and not significant (0.0001, p < 0.1), which does not support Hypothesis 2. Healey 
(1985) also theorized that debt contract can prompt the selection of discretionary accounting 
policies. Zimmerman (1986) mentioned that executives are likely to pick income-increasing 





Dacc  Coef.  St.Err.  t-value  p-value  [95% 
Conf 
Interval]  Sig 
 ROA 0.058 0.009 6.69 0.000 0.041         0.074 *** 
 Ldebt 0.001 0.000 1.63 0.104 0.000 0.001  
 Constant -0.008 0.003 -2.67 0.008 -0.014 -0.002 *** 
 
Mean dependent var -0.000 SD dependent var   0.040 
Number of obs   3564.000 Chi-square   44.947 
 




Table 3: Results of Regression Using the Formula 
 DAcc=𝛽0+ 𝛽1ROA+𝛽2Debt + ControlVar+ 𝜀 (1)      
 
Table 3  
 
Regression Results (Main Effects) 
 
      (1) 
       Dacc 
 Firm Size 0.003* 
   (0.002) 
 Operating Cycle -0.001 
   (0.001) 
 Sales Volatility -0.000 
   (0.001) 
 Cash Flow Volatility -0.004*** 
   (0.001) 
 Change in Revenue -0.000 
   (0.000) 
 ROA 0.057*** 
   (0.009) 
 Ldebt 0.001 
   (0.000) 
 _cons -0.009 
   (0.008) 
 Obs. 3553 
 Pseudo R2  .z 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
When control variables are added to the equation, the coefficient for ROA is .057, with a 
significant p value (p < 0.01), and the debt coefficient is .001. The p value is not significant, but 
the control variable cash flow volatility with a negative coefficient of -0.004 is significant (p < 
0.01). The control variable firm size, with a positive coefficient of 0.003, is also significant (p < 
0.10). The debt covenant premise asserts that managers whose firms are closer to defaulting on 
their debt are more likely to shift their earnings from a future period to the current period. When 




practical terms, when firms see tendencies toward defaulting on their debt, they tend to manage 
earnings to prevent debt violation (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994).     
Table 4 
 
Regression Results (Unmoderated Effects) 
 
      (1) 
       Dacc 
 Firm Size 0.003** 
   (0.002) 
 Operating Cycle -0.000 
   (0.001) 
 Sales Volatility -0.001 
   (0.001) 
 Cash Flow Volatility -0.004*** 
   (0.001) 
 Change in Revenue 0.000 
   (0.000) 
 ROA 0.055*** 
   (0.010) 
 Ldebt 0.001 
   (0.001) 
 Gender 0.003 
   (0.002) 
 Knowledge Diversity -0.000 
   (0.003) 
 Values Diversity 0.001 
   (0.003) 
 Risk Diversity 0.001 
   (0.003) 
 _cons -0.013 
   (0.008) 
 Obs. 3133 
 Pseudo R2  .z 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  






Table 4, using GEE, shows the unmoderated regression estimate incorporating the 
moderating variables in the model. As shown, the ROA coefficient is 0.055, p < 0.01. Debt has a 
coefficient of 0.001, which is not significant and does not support H2. The control variable firm 
size has a positive coefficient (0.003, p < 0.05), and cash flow volatility has a negative 
coefficient (-0.004, p < 0.01), which are not significant and significant, respectively. 
Results of Moderating Effects of TMT Attributes on Earnings Management, ROA 
(Performance), and Debt 
The following models using GEE (Liang & Zeger, 1986) are consistent with previous research on 
outcomes like CEO narcissism (Petrenko et al., 2015). I will show results for the effects of TMT 
attributes (gender diversity, knowledge diversity (education); standardized Blau’s index (a 
composite of age and tenure) proxied for risk diversity; and standardized Blau’s index (a composite 
of political affiliation and culture) proxied for values diversity on earnings management and ROA 
(performance).  
 Hypothesis 3 states that TMT gender diversity will moderate the relationship between 
capital market motives (ROA) and level of earnings management, such that the relationship will 
weaken in conditions of higher variance in TMT gender diversity. The estimated regression uses 
GEE, with the dependent variable Dacc and the moderating variable Gender*ROA. The coefficient 
of the interaction variable Gender*ROA is negative (-0.026) but not statistically significant, which 
did not support Hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis 4 states that TMT gender diversity will moderate the relationship between 
external contact motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship 
will weaken in conditions of higher variations of TMT gender diversity. I will show the results for 




standardized Blau’s index (a composite of age and tenure) proxied for risk diversity; and 
standardized Blau’s index (a composite of political affiliation and culture) proxied for values 
diversity on earnings management and debt) using GEE analysis. When firms are on the verge of 
defaulting their contractual obligations, managers are more likely to manage earnings. I estimated 
that the relationship between discretionary accruals and debt weakened with the interaction of 
Gender*debt with a coefficient of 0.000, which did not support H4 and was not significant.  
Hypothesis 5 states that TMT knowledge diversity will moderate the relationship between 
capital market motives (ROA) and level of earnings management, such that the relationship will 
weaken in conditions of higher variations of TMT knowledge diversity. As shown in Table 5 
below, the moderation coefficient of knowledge diversity interaction is positive and significant 
(0.073, p < 0.01) and therefore implies that it strengthens rather than weakens the relationship, 
failing to support H5. These results indicate that knowledge diversity among TMT members 
strengthens the relationship between discretionary accruals and ROA.  
Hypothesis 6 states that TMT knowledge diversity will moderate the relationship between 
external contact motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship 
will weaken in conditions of higher variations of TMT knowledge diversity. The moderation 
relationship is not statistically significant and does not support H6.  
   Hypothesis 7 states that TMT value diversity (political affiliation and culture) will 
moderate the relationship between capital market motives (ROA) and the level of earnings 
management, such that this relationship will weaken in conditions of higher TMT values diversity. 
In Table 5 below, the moderation effect of values diversity, which is a standardized Blau’s 
index composite mean of political affiliation and cultural diversity as a proxy for values diversity, 




Hypothesis 8 states that TMT values diversity will moderate the relationship between 
external contract motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship 
will weaken in conditions of higher variation of TMT values diversity. In Table 6 below, the 
moderation effect of values diversity shows a negative but not significant coefficient and, 
therefore, H8 is not supported.   
Hypothesis 9 states that risk diversity and capital market motives does not negatively 
moderate the relationship between capital market motives (ROA) and the level of earnings 
management. It has a positive and significant coefficient, showing that it actually strengthens the 
relationship between discretionary accruals and performance (ROA), which fails to support the 
Hypothesis 9.  
Hypothesis 10 states that TMT risk diversity will moderate the relationship between 
external contract motives (debt) and the level of earnings management, such that the relationship 
will weaken in conditions of higher variation of TMT risk diversity. This moderating effect has a 




GEE Interaction Regression Results for ROA, H3, H5, H7, and H9 
 
                 
       Dacc    Dacc    Dacc    Dacc  
Firm Size 0.003** 0.003* 0.003** 0.003**  
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Operating Cycle -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Sales Volatility -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***  
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Revenue Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  




   (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)  
Ldebt 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Gender Diversity 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003  
   (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.000 -0.005 -0.000 0.000  
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
Values Diversity 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000  
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)  
Risk Diversity 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.012***  
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  
Gender*ROA -0.026     
   (0.027)     
Knowledge*ROA  0.073***    
    (0.023)    
Values 
Diversity*ROA 
  0.039   
     (0.034)   
Risk 
Diversity*ROA 
   0.189***  
      (0.031)  
_cons -0.014 -0.010 -0.012 -0.011  
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
Obs. 3133 3133 3133 3133  
Pseudo R2  .z .z .z .z  
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  








GEE Interaction Regression Results for Debt, H4, H6, H8 and H10 
 
                 
       Dacc    Dacc    Dacc    Dacc  
Firm Size 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***  
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Operating Cycle -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000  
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Sales Volatility -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***  
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Revenue Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
ROA 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053***  
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
Debt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Gender Diversity 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003  
   (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.001  
   (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)  
Values Diversity 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.004  
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005)  
Risk Diversity 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002  
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  
Gender*Debt 0.000     
   (0.001)     
Knowledge*Debt  -0.000    
    (0.001)    
Values*Debt   -0.000   
     (0.001)   
Risk*Debt    0.012  
      (0.010)  
_cons -0.016* -0.018* -0.017* -0.016*  
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)  
Obs. 3133 3133 3133 3133  
Pseudo R2  .z .z .z .z  
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  






I used the controls and the moderating variables to test the strength of the equation using 
the GEE method. The results were consistent with previous research on the outcomes (CEO 
narcissism; Petrenko et al., 2015). The purpose of this test was to assess the relative strength 
(measured in terms of statistical significance) of the coefficients of the variables used in the 
hypotheses tests, which includes the moderating variables. ROA is significant with a positive 
coefficient.  
The control variable of firm size selected for this study demonstrated results that were 
consistent with previous studies (Kouaib & Almulhim, 2019; Qi et al., 2018). Firm size, which is 
proxied using the natural log of total assets, showed positive coefficients and was statistically 
significant. Firm sizes  (larger and smaller firms) are likely to influence earnings management 
practices (Beaudoin et al., 2014). The other control variables are not significant, except cash 
volatility with negative coefficients, which was significant. This suggests that cash volatility 
impacts discretionary accruals behavior.   
 Robustness Check  
To perform a robustness check, I ran a panel fixed effects model regression using the GEE, 
as prescribed by Liang and Zeger (1986).   
The estimates of the regression models using the GEE model with ROA and all the 
moderating variables, including all the controls variables, indicated results were consistent, as 
shown in Appendix B (see outcomes like CEO narcissism in Petrenko et al. [2015]). This tested 
the sturdiness of the effects of the discretionary accruals obtained from the fixed effects model. 
The results were similar to the ROA positive coefficients and the results were significant. Also, 




I used GEE in Stata, changing the within-group correlation structured model from 
exchangeable, independent, and unstructured. I obtained results close or similar to  the base model. 
I also looked at the interaction effects of age, tenure, political affiliation, and culture on 
discretionary accrual and ROA. Gender and political affiliation weakened the relationships, whilst 
age, tenure, and cultural diversity strengthened the relationship with significant p values. This 
panel fixed effects model is shown in Appendix B. The results were consistent and address 
endogeneity issues. For the purposes of robustness, I re-ran the model with a 2-lag instrumented 
Arellano and Bond generalized method of moments estimation. The results are consistent and are 









In this study I examined the impact of top management team (TMT) diversity and the 
moderating role of TMT diversity on earnings management. I used discretionary accruals as proxy 
for earnings management. This is consistent with prior research on earnings management, which 
also used the discretionary accrual method in their analyses (Badertscher, 2011; Dechow & 
Skinner, 2000). 
 The independent variables I used were capital market motives return of assets (ROA), 
proxied for performance, and external contract motives, which is financial leverage (debt), as the 
main effect to establish the relationship between the dependent variable (discretionary accrual) and 
the independent variables (ROA and debt). The TMT diversity attributes are the moderating 
variables for the study, grouped (age and tenure) as proxies for risk diversity, were computed as 
the standardized Blau’s mean of age and tenure. Values diversity, which was calculated as the 
composite standardized Blau’s mean for political affiliation and culture, gender diversity, and 
knowledge (education), as hypothesized in the study relationship was established between 
discretionary accrual and performance (ROA). Firms that are underperforming are more likely to 
engage in earnings manipulation. I further found that the TMTs’ characteristics moderated the 
relationship between discretionary accrual and ROA such that the relationship was weakened by 
gender. The interaction of gender diversity did not support the hypothesis. This is consistent with 




gender diversity and firm performance based on social identity theory, but was not consistent with 
the study performed by Svyantek and Boot (2004), where they posited that there were no effects 
of gender diversity on firm performance. 
Furthermore, knowledge diversity did not support the hypothesis. There was positive 
correlation/association between educated TMTs and earnings manipulation, meaning that the more 
educated the TMT members are, the more earnings manipulation they engage in; this was shown 
in the statistically significant p value obtained in the results. Most TMT members have graduate 
degrees, based on the data obtained for this study. The other moderating variables—risk diversity, 
values, debt diversity, and gender diversity—did not support the study hypotheses, as predicted.  
 The control variables of firm size and cash flow volatility did moderate the relationship, 
either negatively or positively as indicated by their respective p values. I also ran absolute 
discretionary accrual with ROA and debt and the results showed no relationship. However, a 
positive significant relationship was established between absolute discretionary accrual and ROA 
in that one of the control variables run with absolute discretionary accrual and ROA was consistent. 
These study results are line with many other studies conducted over the years. For instance, Ghose 
and Moon (2010) pointed out that quality of earnings reduces across the board when debt level 
increases. Similarly, Bassiouny (2016) reported that debt has a significant positive impact on 
earnings management. Additionally, Kobbi-Fakhfah et al. (2018) discovered that financial 
leverage affects the quality of earnings negatively. This result reinforces the foregoing argument 
that managers trying to avoid debt covenant manipulate earnings (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994), 
and this is consistent with upper echelons theory and agency theory. Conversely, this result does 
not support the findings of the study conducted by Hassan and Farouk (2014), who observed that 




between level of monitoring and debt surges that require management to reveal more information 
to improve the quality of earnings.  
The role of individual factors and team processes have significant effects on firms’ 
outcomes from a theoretical point of view and this is consistent with the upper echelons theory as 
suggested by Hambrick and Manson (1984) Hambrick and Mason (1984) focused on attributes of 
TMT rather than individual managers for a better outcome for the firm. Teamwork is the gateway 
to the success of quality earnings reporting and performance for any modern organization. The 
theory becomes essential in understanding how TMT characteristics influence the outcomes of 
organizations relating to financial reporting and accounting choices. Even though the central 
assumption of the upper echelons theory is that human limitations impact mindfulness, 
evaluations, and decisions about organizational problems, the theory still provides a general 
guideline on management team influence on choices, behavior, and the process used in establishing 
the top management. The moderating variables’ (TMT attributes) impact on earnings management 
is also consistent with upper echelons theory. The theory clearly states that an organization’s 
outcomes and strategic choices in either management, finances, or accounting and performance 
levels are partially predicted by managerial background characteristics (Hambrick, 2007; 








CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
In conclusion, in this study I did not find weakening effects for any of the TMT diversity 
variables in the relationships between ROA or debt and earnings management. In post hoc analysis 
I splinted my measurement of risk diversity into age diversity and tenure diversity to see if any of 
the components worked as predicted by my theory and found that age diversity significantly 
weakens the relationship between ROA and earnings management. This implies that looking for a 
more specific measurement of TMT diversity factors may produce some potential compositional 
features that may serve to control earnings management in TMTs.   
Study Limitations 
I acknowledge several limitations in my empirical analyses. First, my study sample consists 
of firms from the S&P 500 index for the period 2008–2018 in the United States. My empirical 
findings may not necessarily be applicable to other firms not listed under the S&P 500 index. Also, 
my selection of the top five TMT executive members was based on their compensation but not on 
other parameters such as educational background, tenure of service, age, and experience. Lack of 
inclusion of these other parameters in this study might have skewed the outcome of the results. 
Additionally, I used secondary data, and at some point human error or bias may have been 
introduced in obtaining the data. There might be missing data that could have impacted and 
contributed to the  results obtained in this study. Furthermore, the bias in the sample size regarding 




results because of the very low variance in my gender diversity variable. Moreover, the lack of 
data for control variables might have impacted the results as well. Integrating more controls such 
as governance and audit quality may have yielded different results. Besides, in the case of cultural 
diversity, where I used location where first degree was earned as proxy for TMT’s nationality, the 
place where the first degree was earned may not have been the correct choice. This study basically 
relied on panel regression analysis, which provides for the association between the variables. 
Finally, moderating some combined demographic characteristic variables of TMT members such 
as risk diversity being a composite of age and tenure and values diversity being a composite of 
political affiliations and culture might have had consequences for the results.  
These limitations point to opportunities for future research. Future researchers could look 
at the cultural impact on earnings quality using the Hofstede cultural dimension. They also, could 
look at the moderating roles of firm size and cash flow volatility on earnings management. In the 
case of cultural diversity, better measurement could create a more consistent measurement of TMT 
members’ place of birth. Other demographic characteristics, like ethnicity or religion, or a personal 
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Average of Present Age 
Female           57  
Male            59 
 
Average of Total Tenure 
Female  25  
Male             24 
 
Education 
Bachelor's degree 32.64% 




North America/Canada 91.40% 
Other                              8.55% 


















Fixed Effects Panel Regression Results 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
       Dacc    Dacc    Dacc    Dacc    Dacc 
Firm Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Operating Cycle 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash Flow volatility -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Revenue Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.064*** 0.023 0.050*** 0.007 0.009 
   (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) 
Ldebt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
   (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Knowledge Diversity 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.005 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Values Diversity -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Risk Diversity 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.013*** -0.013*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
_Gender*ROA -0.015    -0.021 
   (0.029)    (0.029) 
Knowledge*ROA  0.078***   -0.007 
    (0.025)   (0.032) 
Values *ROA   0.057  0.025 
     (0.037)  (0.042) 
_Risk*ROA    0.202*** 0.203*** 
      (0.032) (0.037) 
 _cons -0.018 -0.014 -0.017 -0.012 -0.012 
   (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
 Obs. 3133 3133 3133 3133 3133 
 R-squared  0.016 0.020 0.017 0.030 0.030 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  






Fixed Effects Panel Regression Results 
 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
       Dacc    Dacc    Dacc    Dacc 
Firm Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Operating Cycle 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash Flow Volatility -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Revenue Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ldebt 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Knowledge Diversity 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.005 
   (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
Values Diversity -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) 
Risk Diversity 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Gender*Debt -0.000    
   (0.001)    
Knowledge*Debt  -0.001   
    (0.001)   
Values 
Diversity*Debt 
  0.000  
     (0.001)  
Risk Diversity*Debt    0.014 
      (0.011) 
_cons -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.017 
   (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Obs. 3133 3133 3133 3133 
R-squared  0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  







Arellano and Bond Generalized Methods of Moments Estimation Results 
 
Arellano and Bond Generalized Methods Regression Results 
  






 Interval]  Sig 
Firm Size 0.008 0.003 2.44 0.015 0.002 0.014 ** 
Operating Cycle -0.002 0.003 -0.82 0.410 -0.008 0.003  
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.001 -0.34 0.733 -0.003 0.002  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.006 0.001 -4.63 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 *** 
Dchgrev 0.000 0.000 0.83 0.406 0.000 0.000  
ROA 0.061 0.049 1.23 0.218 -0.036 0.157  
Ldebt -0.003 0.001 -2.48 0.013 -0.005 -0.001 ** 
Gender 0.008 0.006 1.28 0.202 -0.004 0.019  
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.003 0.004 -0.83 0.409 -0.010 0.004  
ValueDiv 0.002 0.005 0.36 0.721 -0.008 0.011  




-0.023 0.066 -0.34 0.735 -0.153 0.108  
 2008b.fyear 0.000 . . . . .  
 2009.fyear -0.003 0.005 -0.61 0.542 -0.012 0.006  
 2010.fyear -0.007 0.005 -1.47 0.143 -0.015 0.002  
 2011.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.71 0.087 -0.016 0.001 * 
 2012.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.62 0.106 -0.015 0.001  
 2013.fyear -0.007 0.005 -1.63 0.104 -0.016 0.002  
 2014.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.71 0.088 -0.017 0.001 * 
 2015.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.48 0.139 -0.015 0.002  
 2016.fyear -0.006 0.004 -1.38 0.168 -0.014 0.002  
 2017.fyear -0.004 0.006 -0.72 0.470 -0.016 0.008  
 2018.fyear -0.004 0.005 -0.83 0.404 -0.015 0.006  
 Constant -0.004 0.021 -0.19 0.851 -0.045 0.037  
 
Mean dependent var -0.000 SD dependent var   0.040 
Number of obs   3133.000 Chi-square   45.329 
 







Arellano and Bond Generalized Methods Regression Results 
  






 Interval]  Sig 
Firm Size 0.008 0.003 2.41 0.016 0.002 0.015 ** 
Operating Cycle -0.002 0.003 -0.83 0.407 -0.008 0.003  
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.001 -0.12 0.907 -0.002 0.002  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.006 0.001 -4.55 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 *** 
Dchgrev 0.000 0.000 0.80 0.426 0.000 0.000  
ROA -0.001 0.034 -0.03 0.976 -0.067 0.065  
Ldebt -0.003 0.001 -2.48 0.013 -0.005 -0.001 ** 
Gender 0.007 0.004 1.87 0.061 0.000 0.015 * 
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.011 0.006 -1.87 0.061 -0.022 0.000 * 
ValueDiv 0.002 0.005 0.44 0.660 -0.007 0.011  
RiskDiv 0.005 0.004 1.11 0.269 -0.004 0.013  
int_know_ROA 0.102 0.056 1.80 0.072 -0.009 0.212 * 
 2008b.fyear 0.000 . . . . .  
 2009.fyear -0.004 0.004 -0.81 0.420 -0.012 0.005  
 2010.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.80 0.072 -0.017 0.001 * 
 2011.fyear -0.009 0.005 -1.94 0.053 -0.018 0.000 * 
 2012.fyear -0.008 0.004 -1.86 0.063 -0.016 0.000 * 
 2013.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.72 0.085 -0.017 0.001 * 
 2014.fyear -0.009 0.005 -1.83 0.067 -0.018 0.001 * 
 2015.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.63 0.104 -0.016 0.001  
 2016.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.55 0.122 -0.015 0.002  
 2017.fyear -0.005 0.006 -0.83 0.408 -0.017 0.007  
 2018.fyear -0.005 0.005 -0.90 0.368 -0.014 0.005  
 Constant -0.005 0.021 -0.22 0.829 -0.046 0.037  
 
Mean dependent var -0.000 SD dependent var   0.040 
Number of obs   3133.000 Chi-square   49.562 
 



















Arellano and Bond Generalized Methods Regression Results 
  






 Interval]  Sig 
Firm Size 0.008 0.003 2.50 0.013 0.002 0.015 ** 
Operating Cycle -0.002 0.003 -0.83 0.409 -0.008 0.003  
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.001 -0.28 0.776 -0.002 0.002  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.006 0.001 -4.44 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 *** 
Dchgrev 0.000 0.000 0.85 0.394 0.000 0.000  
ROA 0.051 0.057 0.89 0.374 -0.062 0.164  
Ldebt -0.003 0.001 -2.67 0.008 -0.005 -0.001 *** 
Gender 0.008 0.004 2.13 0.033 0.001 0.016 ** 
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.005 0.004 -1.27 0.203 -0.013 0.003  
ValueDiv 0.001 0.010 0.09 0.930 -0.018 0.020  
RiskDiv 0.004 0.004 0.91 0.365 -0.004 0.012  
 
int_values_ROA 
0.018 0.110 0.17 0.866 -0.196 0.233  
 2008b.fyear 0.000 . . . . .  
 2009.fyear -0.003 0.005 -0.65 0.516 -0.012 0.006  
 2010.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.70 0.090 -0.016 0.001 * 
 2011.fyear -0.008 0.004 -1.98 0.047 -0.017 0.000 ** 
 2012.fyear -0.008 0.004 -1.79 0.074 -0.016 0.001 * 
 2013.fyear -0.008 0.004 -1.71 0.087 -0.016 0.001 * 
 2014.fyear -0.008 0.004 -1.93 0.053 -0.017 0.000 * 
 2015.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.66 0.098 -0.015 0.001 * 
 2016.fyear -0.006 0.004 -1.54 0.123 -0.014 0.002  
 2017.fyear -0.005 0.006 -0.84 0.403 -0.016 0.007  
 2018.fyear -0.006 0.005 -1.03 0.304 -0.016 0.005  
 Constant -0.003 0.023 -0.14 0.886 -0.048 0.042  
 
Mean dependent var -0.000 SD dependent var   0.040 
Number of obs   3133.000 Chi-square   61.634 
 


















Arellano and Bond Generalized Methods Regression Results 
  






 Interval]  Sig 
Firm Size 0.007 0.004 1.96 0.049 0.000 0.015 ** 
Operating Cycle 0.000 0.003 -0.18 0.858 -0.006 0.005  
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.001 -0.40 0.689 -0.002 0.002  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.005 0.001 -4.34 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 *** 
Dchgrev 0.000 0.000 0.73 0.466 0.000 0.000  
ROA -0.010 0.031 -0.30 0.761 -0.071 0.052  
Ldebt -0.002 0.001 -2.00 0.046 -0.005 0.000 ** 
Gender 0.008 0.004 2.08 0.038 0.000 0.015 ** 
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.004 0.004 -1.19 0.234 -0.011 0.003  
ValueDiv 0.001 0.005 0.30 0.765 -0.008 0.010  
RiskDiv -0.013 0.010 -1.27 0.205 -0.032 0.007  
int_Risk_ROA 0.235 0.122 1.92 0.054 -0.005 0.474 * 
 2008b.fyear 0.000 . . . . .  
 2009.fyear -0.003 0.005 -0.62 0.534 -0.012 0.006  
 2010.fyear -0.006 0.005 -1.33 0.183 -0.015 0.003  
 2011.fyear -0.008 0.004 -1.73 0.083 -0.016 0.001 * 
 2012.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.52 0.129 -0.016 0.002  
 2013.fyear -0.007 0.005 -1.44 0.150 -0.016 0.002  
 2014.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.55 0.120 -0.017 0.002  
 2015.fyear -0.005 0.004 -1.25 0.211 -0.014 0.003  
 2016.fyear -0.005 0.005 -1.19 0.236 -0.014 0.003  
 2017.fyear -0.005 0.006 -0.92 0.360 -0.017 0.006  
 2018.fyear -0.005 0.005 -0.87 0.386 -0.015 0.006  
 Constant -0.012 0.022 -0.53 0.595 -0.056 0.032  
 
Mean dependent var -0.000 SD dependent var   0.040 
Number of obs   3133.000 Chi-square   41.404 
 



















Arellano and Bond Generalized Methods Regression Results  
 






 Interval]  Sig 
Firm Size 0.006 0.004 1.53 0.127 -0.002 0.014  
Operating Cycle -0.001 0.003 -0.50 0.620 -0.007 0.004  
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.001 0.13 0.899 -0.002 0.002  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.006 0.001 -4.65 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 *** 
Dchgrev 0.000 0.000 0.86 0.392 0.000 0.000  
ROA 0.062 0.041 1.50 0.133 -0.019 0.142  
Ldebt -0.002 0.001 -1.60 0.109 -0.004 0.000  
Gender 0.001 0.014 0.09 0.928 -0.026 0.028  
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.005 0.004 -1.22 0.224 -0.012 0.003  
ValueDiv 0.002 0.004 0.43 0.668 -0.007 0.011  
RiskDiv 0.004 0.005 0.89 0.371 -0.005 0.014  
 
int_Gender_debt 
0.001 0.002 0.61 0.539 -0.002 0.004  
 2008b.fyear 0.000 . . . . .  
 2009.fyear -0.002 0.005 -0.52 0.606 -0.011 0.007  
 2010.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.48 0.140 -0.015 0.002  
 2011.fyear -0.008 0.004 -1.90 0.058 -0.017 0.000 * 
 2012.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.82 0.068 -0.015 0.001 * 
 2013.fyear -0.007 0.005 -1.64 0.102 -0.016 0.001  
 2014.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.76 0.078 -0.017 0.001 * 
 2015.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.59 0.112 -0.015 0.002  
 2016.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.53 0.127 -0.015 0.002  
 2017.fyear -0.005 0.006 -0.85 0.395 -0.016 0.006  
 2018.fyear -0.006 0.005 -1.15 0.251 -0.016 0.004  
 Constant -0.002 0.025 -0.08 0.936 -0.050 0.046  
 
Mean dependent var -0.000 SD dependent var   0.040 
Number of obs   3133.000 Chi-square   49.760 
 


















Arellano and Bond Generalized Methods Regression Results 
  






 Interval]  Sig 
Firm Size 0.005 0.003 1.58 0.115 -0.001 0.012  
Operating Cycle 0.000 0.003 0.07 0.942 -0.006 0.006  
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.001 -0.00 0.997 -0.002 0.002  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.006 0.001 -4.24 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 *** 
Dchgrev 0.000 0.000 0.81 0.420 0.000 0.000  
ROA 0.069 0.044 1.56 0.118 -0.018 0.156  
Ldebt -0.001 0.001 -0.57 0.569 -0.003 0.002  
Gender 0.007 0.004 1.98 0.048 0.000 0.015 ** 
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.001 0.010 -0.15 0.883 -0.021 0.018  
ValueDiv 0.001 0.004 0.16 0.870 -0.008 0.009  
RiskDiv 0.003 0.005 0.74 0.459 -0.005 0.012  
int_know_debt 0.000 0.001 -0.25 0.800 -0.003 0.002  
 2008b.fyear 0.000 . . . . .  
 2009.fyear -0.002 0.004 -0.57 0.567 -0.011 0.006  
 2010.fyear -0.005 0.004 -1.21 0.225 -0.014 0.003  
 2011.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.61 0.107 -0.016 0.002  
 2012.fyear -0.006 0.004 -1.46 0.145 -0.014 0.002  
 2013.fyear -0.006 0.005 -1.31 0.190 -0.015 0.003  
 2014.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.59 0.111 -0.016 0.002  
 2015.fyear -0.006 0.004 -1.39 0.166 -0.015 0.003  
 2016.fyear -0.006 0.004 -1.42 0.155 -0.014 0.002  
 2017.fyear -0.006 0.006 -0.99 0.324 -0.017 0.006  
 2018.fyear -0.006 0.005 -1.17 0.240 -0.016 0.004  
 Constant -0.017 0.022 -0.77 0.439 -0.062 0.027  
 
Mean dependent var -0.000 SD dependent var   0.040 
Number of obs   3133.000 Chi-square   26.454 
 



















Arellano and Bond Generalized Methods Regression Results 
  






 Interval]  Sig 
Firm Size 0.008 0.003 2.38 0.017 0.001 0.015 ** 
Operating Cycle -0.002 0.003 -0.60 0.550 -0.007 0.004  
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.001 -0.24 0.807 -0.002 0.002  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.006 0.001 -4.69 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 *** 
Dchgrev 0.000 0.000 0.85 0.397 0.000 0.000  
ROA 0.067 0.043 1.56 0.119 -0.017 0.151  
Ldebt -0.003 0.001 -2.32 0.020 -0.005 0.000 ** 
Gender 0.009 0.004 2.13 0.033 0.001 0.017 ** 
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.005 0.004 -1.31 0.190 -0.013 0.003  
ValueDiv 0.000 0.017 0.01 0.990 -0.032 0.033  
RiskDiv 0.003 0.005 0.57 0.571 -0.006 0.011  
int_values_debt 0.000 0.002 0.14 0.887 -0.004 0.004  
 2008b.fyear 0.000 . . . . .  
 2009.fyear -0.003 0.005 -0.65 0.519 -0.012 0.006  
 2010.fyear -0.006 0.005 -1.37 0.169 -0.015 0.003  
 2011.fyear -0.008 0.004 -1.70 0.090 -0.016 0.001 * 
 2012.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.61 0.106 -0.015 0.001  
 2013.fyear -0.007 0.005 -1.40 0.163 -0.016 0.003  
 2014.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.67 0.096 -0.018 0.001 * 
 2015.fyear -0.007 0.005 -1.46 0.144 -0.015 0.002  
 2016.fyear -0.006 0.004 -1.38 0.166 -0.015 0.003  
 2017.fyear -0.005 0.006 -0.84 0.400 -0.017 0.007  
 2018.fyear -0.006 0.005 -1.05 0.294 -0.016 0.005  
 Constant -0.013 0.024 -0.53 0.596 -0.060 0.034  
 
Mean dependent var -0.000 SD dependent var   0.040 
Number of obs   3133.000 Chi-square   47.919 
 



















Arellano and Bond Generalized Methods Regression Results  
 






 Interval]  Sig 
Firm Size 0.008 0.004 2.21 0.027 0.001 0.015 ** 
Operating Cycle -0.001 0.003 -0.53 0.599 -0.007 0.004  
Sales Volatility 0.000 0.001 -0.02 0.987 -0.002 0.002  
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
-0.006 0.001 -4.49 0.000 -0.009 -0.003 *** 
Dchgrev 0.000 0.000 0.91 0.363 0.000 0.000  
ROA 0.065 0.043 1.50 0.134 -0.020 0.149  
Ldebt -0.003 0.001 -2.33 0.020 -0.005 0.000 ** 
Gender 0.007 0.004 1.94 0.053 0.000 0.015 * 
Knowledge 
Diversity 
-0.004 0.004 -0.92 0.358 -0.011 0.004  
ValueDiv -0.005 0.008 -0.64 0.521 -0.020 0.010  
RiskDiv -0.002 0.006 -0.29 0.768 -0.014 0.011  
int_Risk_debt 0.021 0.016 1.37 0.171 -0.009 0.052  
 2008b.fyear 0.000 . . . . .  
 2009.fyear -0.004 0.005 -0.88 0.378 -0.013 0.005  
 2010.fyear -0.007 0.005 -1.54 0.123 -0.016 0.002  
 2011.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.82 0.068 -0.017 0.001 * 
 2012.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.65 0.099 -0.016 0.001 * 
 2013.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.72 0.086 -0.017 0.001 * 
 2014.fyear -0.008 0.005 -1.82 0.069 -0.018 0.001 * 
 2015.fyear -0.007 0.004 -1.53 0.125 -0.015 0.002  
 2016.fyear -0.006 0.004 -1.48 0.138 -0.015 0.002  
 2017.fyear -0.006 0.006 -1.00 0.318 -0.019 0.006  
 2018.fyear -0.007 0.005 -1.23 0.220 -0.017 0.004  
 Constant -0.010 0.023 -0.43 0.667 -0.056 0.036  
 
Mean dependent var -0.000 SD dependent var   0.040 
Number of obs   3133.000 Chi-square   42.640 
 





Definition of Variables 
Symbol Variable  Measure  
Dependent Variable   
EM 
Earnings 
Management The discretionary accruals estimated by cross-sectional modified Jones model 
(1991)   
   
Independent Variables    
Capital Market Motives  ROA,  Calculated by the net income divided by lagged total assets at year-end. 
 Liquidity 
Calculated by receivables plus inventory minus accounts payable divided by total 
assets. 
   
External Contract Motives 
Financial Leverage-
Debt Calculated by the ratio of the total debt to total assets at year-end. 
   
   
Moderating Variables (TMT Diversity Attributes)  
Blau’s (1977) heterogeneity index used to measure the moderating variables. A 




   
TMT Risk Diversity (Age and 
Tenure) Age TMT age (variation). 
 Tenure Total work experience—years with current job.  




TMT Values Diversity (Political 
and Cultural)  Political Affiliation TMT political affiliation—Democrat, Republican, or Other. 
 Culture  Nationality—place of 1st degree as proxy for nationality. 
   
TMT Knowledge Diversity 
(Education) Education TMT education level—BS, MBA, or PhD. 
   








Natural log of total assets. 
Leverage Ratio 
 
Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Cash Flow Volatility 
 
The standard deviation of sales over 
at least the last five years. 
Operating Cycle 
 
The natural log of the length of the 
firm’s operating cycle, derived as 








 Revchg  Change in revenue (revenue—lag revenue).  
  
Sales Volatility  The standard deviation of sales over at least 
the last five years.  
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